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RESUMO 
 
Os veículos da atualidade vêm integrando um número crescente de 
eletrônica embarcada, com o objetivo de permitir uma experiência mais 
segura aos motoristas. Logo, a garantia da segurança física é um requisito 
que precisa ser observada por completo durante o processo de 
desenvolvimento. O padrão ISO 26262 provê medidas para garantir que 
esses requisitos não sejam negligenciados. Injeção de falhas é fortemente 
recomendada quando da verificação do funcionamento dos mecanismos 
de segurança implementados, assim como sua capacidade de cobertura 
associada ao diagnóstico de falhas existentes. A análise exaustiva não é 
obrigatória, mas evidências de que o máximo esforço foi feito para acurar 
a cobertura de diagnóstico precisam ser apresentadas, principalmente 
durante a avalição dos níveis de segurança associados a arquitetura 
implementada em hardware. Estes níveis dão suporte às alegações de que 
o projeto obedece às métricas de segurança da integridade física exigida 
em aplicações automotivas. Os níveis de integridade variam de A à D, 
sendo este último o mais rigoroso. Essa Tese explora o estado-da-arte em 
soluções de verificação, e tem por objetivo construir uma metodologia 
que permita acelerar a verificação da cobertura de diagnóstico alcançado. 
Diferentemente de outras técnicas voltadas à aceleração de injeção de 
falhas, a metodologia proposta utiliza uma plataforma de hardware 
dedicada à verificação, com o intuito de maximizar o desempenho 
relativo a simulação de falhas. Muitos aspectos relativos a ISO 26262 são 
observados de forma que a presente contribuição possa ser apreciada no 
segmento automotivo. Por fim, uma arquitetura OpenRISC é utilizada 
para confirmar os resultados alcançados com essa solução proposta 
pertencente ao estado-da-arte. 
 
Palavras-chave: Injeção de Falhas. ISO 26262. Integridade Funcional. 
Cobertura de Diagnóstico. Plataforma de Hardware dedicada à 
Verificação. Mecanismos de Segurança.  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Modern vehicles are integrating a growing number of electronics 
to provide a safer experience for the driver. Therefore, safety is a non-
negotiable requirement that must be considered through the vehicle 
development process. The ISO 26262 standard provides guidance to 
ensure that such requirements are implemented. Fault injection is highly 
recommended for the functional verification of safety mechanisms or to 
evaluate their diagnostic coverage capability. An exhaustive analysis is 
not required, but evidence of best effort through the diagnostic coverage 
assessment needs to be provided when performing quantitative evaluation 
of hardware architectural metrics. These metrics support that the 
automotive safety integrity level – ranging from A (lowest) to D (strictest) 
levels – was obeyed. This thesis explores the most advanced verification 
solutions in order to build a methodology to accelerate the diagnostic 
coverage assessment. Different from similar techniques for fault injection 
acceleration, the proposed methodology does not require any 
modification of the design model to enable acceleration. Many functional 
safety requisites in the ISO 26262 are considered thus allowing the 
contribution presented to be a suitable solution for the automotive 
segment. An OpenRISC architecture is used to confirm the results 
achieved by this state-of-the-art solution. 
 
 
Keywords: Fault Injection. ISO 26262. Functional Safety. Diagnostic 
Coverage. Hardware-assisted Verification Platform. Safety Mechanism.  
 
RESUMO EXPANDIDO 
 
INTRODUÇÃO 
 
Os veículos da atualidade vêm integrando um número crescente de 
eletrônica embarcada, com o objetivo de permitir uma experiência mais 
segura aos motoristas. Logo, a garantia da segurança física é um requisito 
que não pode ser negligenciado e o padrão ISO 26262 provê medidas para 
garantir que este seja observado durante o processo de desenvolvimento 
de sistemas embarcados para automóveis de produção em série.  
Entre essas medidas, a injeção de falhas é fortemente recomendada 
pelo ISO 26262 para verificar o correto funcionamento de mecanismos 
de segurança implementados no circuito e de sua capacidade de cobertura 
referente ao diagnóstico de falhas existentes. A análise exaustiva não é 
obrigatória, mas evidências de que o máximo esforço foi praticado para 
acurar a cobertura de diagnóstico precisam ser fornecidas. Isso se aplica, 
especialmente, durante a avalição dos níveis de segurança associados a 
arquitetura implementada em hardware. Estes níveis, denominados ASIL 
(do inglês, Automotive Safety Integrity Level), dão suporte às alegações 
de que o projeto obedece as métricas de segurança da integridade física 
especificada de acordo com a aplicação automotiva alvo. Os ASILs são 
definidos no ISO 26262 e vão de A à D, ou seja, do mais brando até o 
mais rigoroso, respectivamente.  
Essa pesquisa explora o estado-da-arte em soluções de verificação 
visando construir uma metodologia baseada na injeção de falhas que 
permita acelerar a verificação da cobertura de diagnóstico alcançada. 
Diferentemente de outras técnicas voltadas à aceleração de injeção de 
falhas, a metodologia proposta MADC (Methodology To Accelerate 
Diagnostic Coverage Assessment) utiliza uma plataforma de hardware 
dedicada à verificação para maximizar o desempenho da inserção de 
falhas. Muitos aspectos do ISO 26262 são observados de forma que a 
original contribuição deste trabalho possa ser apreciada no segmento 
automotivo. Por fim, resultados obtidos da aplicação da MADC sobre 
uma arquitetura OpenRISC são apresentada. 
 
OBJETIVOS 
 
As evidências utilizadas para dar suporte ao se aclamar que um 
produto é functional safety precisam ser coletadas sobre o efetivo projeto 
do circuito integrado em desenvolvimento. Quando isso não é feito, então 
um conjunto de argumentos robustos que são necessários para justificar a 
utilização de um modelo abstrato como representante do real projeto do 
circuito em desenvolvimento. A geração desse tipo de argumentação pode 
exigir significante esforço para comprovar que há suficiente correlação 
entre o modelo efetivo do circuito e o modelo abstrato usado para análise. 
Visando reduzir esse oneroso esforço adicional, esse trabalho propõe 
MADC para acelerar a campanha de injeção de falhas sem que seja 
necessário qualquer modificação no modelo do circuito ou no nível de 
abstração utilizado. Antes de entrar em mais detalhes referentes a MADC 
proposta, o escopo dessa pesquisa precisa ser definido. Portanto, injeção 
de falhas nesse trabalho significa a imitação do efeito de falhas em 
circuitos integrados descritos a nível de portas lógicas.  
O principal objetivo dessa pesquisa é propor uma metodologia 
que explora ao máximo as vantagens encontradas nas mais avançadas 
soluções de verificação funcional para acelerar a injeção de falhas 
visando verificar os mecanismos de segurança implementados assim 
como sua capacidade de diagnosticar falhas respeitando os preceitos do 
ISO 26262. Para alcançar esses objetivos, os seguintes caminhos foram 
identificados: 
 Investigar soluções de verificação funcional modernas que 
possam ser empregadas na aceleração de injeção de falhas; 
 Familiarizar-se com os padrões mais atuais sobre functional 
safety de modo que suas recomendações fossem observadas 
pela metodologia de injeção de falhas desenvolvida; 
 Construir um modelo prático visando conferir o desempenho 
da metodologia implementada diante de diferentes soluções; 
 Explorar vantagens das mais avançadas ferramentas de 
verificação para minimizar a intrusão da solução proposta. 
O uso de uma plataforma dedicada à verificação funcional para 
acelerar a injeção de falhas acarretou nas seguintes questões: 
 Será viável a utilização de emuladores dedicados a 
verificação funcional para aceleração de injeção de falhas? 
 A metodologia proposta apresenta alguma vantagem cuja não 
seria viável se fosse baseada em outra forma de aceleração? 
 Há limitações na metodologia proposta e como mitigá-las? 
Essa pesquisa exibe resultados referentes à injeção de falhas 
permanentes e o caso de teste é um microprocessador descrito ao nível de 
portas lógicas. Dado que o grau de detalhamento do modelo do circuito 
utilizado influencia no desempenho, então se acredita que o caso de teste 
escolhido consegue destacar as vantagens da solução proposta. Com isso, 
a contribuição original dessa pesquisa pode ser identificada pelo ganho 
em desempenho com a metodologia proposta baseada na aceleração de 
injeção de falhas permanentes sem a necessidade de alterar o modelo do 
circuito sendo verificado. É importante ressaltar que MADC, por não ser 
intrusiva, reduz o esforço referente a geração de justificativas exigidas 
pelo ISO 26262 quando modelos abstratos do circuito são utilizados na 
análise de segurança funcional. Até este momento, o autor desconhece 
trabalho semelhante considerando o escopo definido acima. 
 
METODOLOGIA 
 
Parte do esforço intrínseco em garantir níveis adequados de 
segurança está na necessidade de se gerar evidências que corroborem a 
capacidade dos eletrônicos utilizados em automóveis de reagir 
previsivelmente quando da ocorrência de falhas. Safety mechanisms (SM) 
são adicionados ao sistema embarcado visando maximizar a cobertura de 
falhas passíveis de serem diagnosticadas (do inglês, diagnostic coverage 
– DC) e minimizar possiblidade delas resultarem acidentes. Em outras 
palavras, DC representa a porcentagem da probabilidade falhas que são 
anteparada pelos SMs implementados. Dessa forma, os SMs precisam ter 
sua funcionalidade verificada e se sua participação no nível DC do 
sistema permite atender os requisito do ASIL especificado para aplicação. 
Há diversas técnicas de verificação e validação que vem sendo 
investigadas visando atender desafios inerentes à functional safety. Em 
meio a essas técnicas está simulação de falhas cuja é tradicionalmente 
empregada na geração de testes de manufatura de circuitos integrados. 
Essa pesquisa explora soluções de verificação funcional avançados para 
acelerar injeção de falhas quando comparado com técnicas baseadas em 
simulação, além de sempre observar os preceitos descritos no ISO 26262. 
Logo, MADC permite reduzir o tempo gasto com a análise de DC dos 
SMs implementados, especialmente quando o circuito está descrito ao 
nível de portas lógicas e o desempenho do simulador acaba sendo 
impactada devido à complexidade do modelo executado. A investigação 
do DC não se limita ao nível de portas lógicas uma vez que os valores 
precisam ser constantemente estimados de modo que medidas necessárias 
possam ser tomadas oportunamente. Com isso, soluções integráveis ao 
fluxo de verificação do circuito sendo desenvolvido é essencial. 
Simuladores de falhas avançados foram recentemente anunciadas 
por fornecedores de ferramentas de projeto de circuito integrado 
atendendo requisitos do ISO 26262. Por outro lado, injeção de falhas 
baseada em simulação pode ser proibitivamente longa. Dessa forma, o 
emprego de plataformas de emulação baseadas em hardware dedicados 
para acelerar a campanha de injeção de falhas foi investigado. A MADC 
foi construída sobre uma dessas plataformas comerciais disponíveis cuja 
combina aceleração de simulação e emulação para otimizar a verificação 
funcional. Como injeção de falhas não é nativamente habilitada nessa 
plataforma, então algumas adaptações foram feitas para permitir que esse 
meio fosse empregado nesse estudo. Essa plataforma pode ser empregada 
independentemente do nível de abstração da descrição do circuito, logo, 
a MADC pode ser estendida para além do nível de portas lógicas.  
Diferentes abordagens de aceleração de injeção de falhas foram 
proposta nas últimas décadas. Emuladores de falhas baseados em disposi-
tivos reconfiguráveis como Field-Programable Gate Arrays são tradicio-
nalmente usados para superar o desempenho limitado de simuladores de 
falhas. Metodologias baseadas em emulação apresentam desvantagens 
considerando os requisito do ISO 26262. Uma delas é o fato da análise 
ser realizada sobre um modelo do circuito que não é aquele efetivamente 
enviado para fabricação. Isso porque métodos baseados em intrusão ou 
em emuladores cuja tecnologia fim difere da aplicação final são usados. 
A MADC observa esses aspectos de modo que a injeção de falhas ocorre 
no mesmo modelo utilizado no fluxo de fabricação do circuito integrado. 
Os trabalhos relacionados foram divididos entre os que visam a 
aceleração da injeção de falhas daqueles que mostram o uso da injeção de 
falhas no contexto de validação da integridade funcional. O conhecimento 
adquirido com o segundo grupo ajudou a esclarecer os requisitos no ISO 
26262 que precisam ser observados quanto ao uso de injeção de falhas. 
Desse modo, foi possível identificar quais os pontos das técnicas de 
aceleração apresentados no primeiro grupo que poderiam ser explorados 
no contexto em que esse trabalho foi desenvolvido.  
 
RESULTADOS 
 
Os primeiros experimentos realizados com a MADC ajudaram a 
validar os resultados obtidos se comparado com soluções comerciais. 
Experimentos mais complexos mostram o potencial da solução proposta 
nessa pesquisa, em especial no que se refere a desempenho. Vale lembrar 
que a MADC oferece um melhor desempenho na análise de cobertura de 
falhas observando os requisitos do ISO 26262. Dessa forma, MADC pode 
servir ao segmento automobilístico com uma solução no estado da arte 
não intrusiva para acelerar injeção de falhas. Enfim, diversos avanços 
possíveis para a MADC desenvolvida são discutidos ao mesmo tempo em 
que trabalhos futuros são apresentados.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Car manufacturers are integrating gradually more electronics in the 
vehicles in order to provide a safer experience for their customers – the 
drivers. The existing integrated circuit (IC) technology provides the 
computation power required to develop applications that can process the 
complex data provided by multiple sensors, transforming physical 
readings into electronic signals [1]. Capturing the surrounding 
information allows creating systems capable of deciding whether there 
are traffic hazards around and which actions should be taken to prevent 
or at least to minimize the risk of harming those involved. The data 
processing power available in the car permits to implement safety 
applications among many others like infotainment and car-to-car 
communication.  
The automotive OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers) and 
their suppliers - Tier 1, Tier 2, and so forth – are investing on innovative 
car utilities in order to explore the new market opportunities made 
possible by the current technology. Nowadays, there are many valued 
features to consider when selecting a new car, which go far beyond the 
traditional characteristics, such as engine, internal space, design or fuel 
consumption. Ninety percent of the car novelties are based on electronics 
[2] and some are already available in most modern cars, such as: autopilot 
system, self- parking, no blind spots camera system, collision avoidance 
by auto emergency braking assist, gesture control of the infotainment 
system, cloud-based dashboard access, car keys with parking remote 
control among  many other interesting features [3]. With so many new car 
features being launched on each automotive tradeshow, it seems that this 
is a lucrative market for the OEMs and suppliers that will continue to 
expand – the money spent on the vehicle electronics is expected to grow 
about ten percent by 2022 [2].  
 
1.1. MOTIVATION AND CHALLENGES 
 
With various sensors in the car – some directly exposed to the 
outside world to proper read the physical measures – there is a need for 
specific packaging, circuit board protection and extra wiring to connect 
the sensors to the Electronic Control Units (ECU) [1]. Approximately, up 
to 100 Kg of cabling weight can be found in a car nowadays [4]. The 
additional weight cannot be neglected since it can be linked to the fuel 
consumption increase: 50 kg weight ~ 0.1 liter/100 Km [5]. Moreover, 
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OEMs need to meet new environment regulation hence reducing the CO2 
emission of the next vehicle generations. As a result, innovative 
automotive communication has become a research topic of broad and 
current interest that aims to find solutions for the cabling weight while 
still considering security and the required bandwidth challenges [2]. 
Independently of taking an innovative cabled networking connection or 
even a wireless solution for the communication, safety must always be 
taken into account. 
At the end of the day, safety is a non-negotiable requirement that 
must be considered throughout the vehicle development process. The ISO 
26262 standard provides guidance to ensure that such requirements are 
implemented [6]. Part of the additional effort required to increase safety 
is to provide evidence that the electronics integrated into the car are not 
just functionally correct but also they can handle random faults that may 
occur in the system due to aging or radiation sources, for example. To 
cope with possible fault scenarios, mechanisms are integrated into the 
design in order to add diagnose capability and to make the driver aware 
of any existing problem. In the case of a critical real-time feature, which 
correction may not be possible, then the system must guarantee minimal 
controllability to the driver that should then be able to avoid an accident 
of bigger proportions.  
The safety mechanisms (SM) added to the design are used to 
improve the diagnostic coverage (DC) – i.e., the percentage of existing 
failure probability that is prevented by the SM – for different failure 
modes. The SMs must be functionally verified as well as the DCs 
achieved with them must be assessed. Fault injection is highly 
recommended for the functional verification of SMs and to evaluate their 
DC contribution. Although an exhaustive analysis is not required, 
evidence of best effort through the DC assessment must be provided when 
performing a quantitative evaluation of hardware architectural metrics. 
These metrics are used to identify whether the required automotive safety 
integrity level (ASIL) – ranging from A (lowest) to D (strictest) levels – 
was obeyed. Best effort, in this case, is pushed by the governmental 
regulations, and it can only be justified by using state-of-the-art 
techniques together while performing an assessment as thoroughly as 
possible. 
There are many advanced verification technologies that are being 
explored or tailored to cope with different functional safety challenges. 
The selection of which SMs to be implemented starts at the conceptual 
phase of the design, much sooner than any implementation is made 
available. The DCs at this stage are estimated based on previous data, 
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expert judgment, or guided by reference information from standards like 
the ISO 26262. Along the project development, the requirements initially 
defined must be continuously tracked while more detailed analysis is 
executed in order to provide evidence that these requirements are 
achieved. With progressive design refinement and implementation, a 
rationale approach is used to map the requirements to the corresponding 
parts of the design, thus allowing an analysis considering only safety-
related (S-R) parts. Even after this “divide and conquer” approach is 
performed, the number of faults that are covered by an SM can still be 
unfeasible to verify through fault injection due to the design complexity. 
Therefore, sampling and other statistics methods are used to obtain 
confident assessment results. 
This research explores the most advanced functional verification 
solutions in order to enable fault injection acceleration for SM verification 
and DC assessment. The research work developed aims to enable a more 
thorough safety analyses hence permitting to achieve higher accuracy of 
the metrics used to provide evidence that the design reached the required 
ASIL level. For instance, software based SMs – e.g., software based self-
test (SBST) – typically requires long runs until the diagnostic routine 
completes, and the fault detection can be confirmed. For such kind of SM, 
concurrent fault simulators – commonly used in the Design-for-
Testability (DfT) flow – are not suitable since they do not support 
complex testbenches (TB), which can reproduce the interaction with the 
software. Concurrent simulators normally only support designs at gate-
level (GL), thus benefiting from the structured and modular description 
to optimize the fault simulation. On the other hand, it requires extracting 
static test vectors during normal simulation due to the lack of support of 
advanced TB, which is a time-consuming task. As a result, this kind of 
tool is not suitable for verifying the SMs during the development process. 
This forces the safety assessment to be executed once and only when the 
final GL netlist is available, what is risky since the cost of a design change 
at this stage is unacceptable. Therefore, the design is overprotected with 
extra SMs hence consuming unnecessary area and power to guarantee it 
will pass the safety certification process. Another consideration is that 
transient – fault models required by the ISO 26262 – are not typically 
supported by concurrent fault simulators.  
Fault injection solutions to be used during the development phase 
are being announced by Electronic Design Automation (EDA) vendors, 
such as Incisive Functional Safety Simulator® (IFSS) [7], Certitude® [8], 
Z01X® [9], among others. However, fault injection campaigns using 
simulation can be prohibitively long, especially if the assessment is 
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performed at the system level or if the SM being verified corrects the fault 
hence requiring most of the runs to be executed completely in order to 
classify the fault.  
Targeting the fault injection campaign speed-up, the utilization of 
hardware emulator platforms, such as Veloce® [10], Zebu® [11], and 
Palladium® [12], provided by the biggest EDA vendors has been 
investigated. The thesis research used the former one that is provided by 
Cadence Design Systems, Inc., which combines simulation acceleration 
and emulation capabilities to boost verification throughput and 
productivity. Since this kind of platform is intended for typical functional 
verification, some investigation was necessary to permit leveraging 
Palladium for fault injection acceleration. The most important advantages 
of Palladium are the seamless acceleration despite the design description 
level: register-transfer-level (RTL) or GL. This allowed creating a non-
intrusive acceleration approach for DC assessment of SMs. The proposed 
solution is based on technology edge tools, and the methodology has been 
conceived aiming to become a recommended approach to be used by 
future functional safety standard releases.   
Different fault injection approaches have been proposed through 
the last decades. Many of them aiming to optimize the assessment of 
dependability attributes – e.g., availability, reliability, and safety – of fault 
tolerant designs [13] – especially against soft errors. The techniques can 
be grouped according to the technology/method that underlies the fault 
injection, which can be: hardware or physical injection, simulation and 
emulation. Software-based fault injection can be another group when 
distinguishing hardware design that process software [14]. Each approach 
has specific characteristics that define its application suitability. For 
example, simulation-based approaches are likely to provide more 
controllability and observability, while there is a compromise between 
accuracy and performance that must be considered. Field-programmable 
gate arrays (FPGA) are the most common technology used to emulate 
fault injection by providing the performance that lacks in the simulation 
based solutions. Minimal design modifications – also called 
instrumentation – are required to enable similar controllability and 
observability tough. Despite the facilities costs and the setup complexity, 
hardware or physical fault injection requires a prototype only available 
too late in the design flow and hence not considered here. 
The FPGA-based approach is the most similar to the solution 
explored in this research. However, no design model alteration neither the 
FPGA bitstream generation are required by using Palladium as the 
underlying technology to accelerate fault injection. Only the static 
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analysis algorithm implemented must be executed to collect all faults that 
can be accelerated hence keeping the same design model for simulation, 
emulation, and even sign-off. Since Palladium is a powerful machine 
specially created to accelerate the simulation, it has most features of a 
simulation tool thus providing similar controllability and observability, 
which are leveraged in the implemented solution. When considering 
functional safety, then the latest representation of the design must be used 
for the analysis. Therefore, the acceleration platform used has another 
significant characteristic, and that is: RTL or GL of design description has 
minimal influence on the possible performance gain. Consequently, the 
DC assessment can be performed over the design model most close to the 
sign-off thus satisfying an ISO 26262 certification auditor. Therefore, the 
static analysis implemented together with a platform like Palladium 
enabled the invention of the methodology presented, which permits 
accelerating the DC assessment.  
 
1.2. OBJECTIVES AND ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION 
 
In the functional safety context, the evidence utilized to support the 
claim of safety compliance must be collected based on the design model 
being developed. Otherwise, a set of strong arguments needs to be 
prepared in order to justify the utilization of an abstract model used for 
the safety assessment. The development of such argumentation can 
require an overwhelming effort dedicated to the generation of evidence 
that the design model used accurately represent the actual design model. 
The work developed in the context of this thesis seeks the provision of a 
fault injection acceleration solution that does not rely on changing the 
design representation, in order to enable the acceleration. Given the 
distinct possibilities of employing fault injection, it is important to define 
the research scope clearly. From this moment on, fault injection means 
the imitation of fault effects at the semiconductor level, using the design 
model prior production – i.e. HDL description, either RTL or GL. 
The main objective of this thesis is to propose a methodology to 
leverage the most advanced functional verification solutions in order 
to accelerate fault injection for SM verification and DC assessment. 
To meet this thesis objective, a few means were identified: 
 To investigate the available technology edge solutions for 
function verification, which can be explored to accelerate the 
fault injection campaigns;  
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 To become functional safety literate in order to tailor the 
conception of a methodology taking into account the state-of-
the-art recommendations presented in the standards;  
 To build a proof-of-concept flow based on the developed 
scripts that enable seamless utilization of different tools to 
compare the results and validate the correctness of the 
proposed methodology; 
 To implement a solution leveraging the tools available to 
analyze the design in order to minimize the intrusiveness of 
the proposed acceleration approach. 
As already mentioned, the utilization of hardware-assisted 
verification platforms towards the acceleration of fault injection is 
investigated. Therefore, the following research questions are considered: 
 Is the fault injection using a hardware-assisted platform 
feasible? 
 Does the proposed methodology provide any advantage 
towards functional safety which would not be achieved with 
other acceleration solutions? 
 Are there limitations and what can be done do minimize their 
impact? 
This research focuses on the injection of permanent faults. A 
microprocessor architecture, described at gate-level, has been chosen as 
a case study. The detail level of the design model used can significantly 
impact the simulation performance. Hence it is believed that a test case 
described at gate-level can better highlight the advantages of the proposed 
solution. Within this scope, the Thesis original contribution can be 
defined as the performance gain achieved with the proposed methodology 
via the fault injection acceleration of permanent faults without requiring 
modification or a different design model while reusing the existing 
verification environment – e.g., not requiring TB transformation to allow 
using traditional DfT fault simulators. To the best of this author's 
knowledge, there is no published work considering this specific scope.  
The proposed methodology utilization is not limited to the gate-
level netlist and the automotive scope. In fact, it is a generic fault injection 
acceleration solution that can be leveraged in other industry segments like 
avionics or applied at different abstraction levels. For that reason, fault 
injection techniques relevant to aerospace applications are discussed as 
well as methods pertinent to the automotive area. However, it is important 
to emphasize that this Thesis focuses exclusively on addressing the 
challenges derived from the ISO 26262, which is the functional safety 
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standard tailored for the automotive applications. The results achieved 
with the developed proof-of-concept highlights the potential benefit 
offered by the proposed methodology. 
 
1.3. ORGANIZATION 
 
The thesis is divided in the following manner: Chapter 0 provides 
an ISO 26262 overview, and the functional safety context covered in this 
Thesis. Chapter 3 analyzes related work in the area of fault injection but 
within the safety context and its different applications. Chapter 0 details 
the many fault injection concepts, and it also discusses the state-of-the-
art acceleration approaches targeting the fault injection optimization. A 
literature review covering different fault injection acceleration techniques 
is presented in Chapter 5. The characteristics of each reviewed 
acceleration approaches are discussed in order to identify their suitability 
to the functional safety domain. Therefore, Chapter 5 allows highlighting 
how the Thesis’ original contribution distinguishes from the rest of the 
solutions found in the literature. Chapter 6 goes through the developed 
non-intrusive approach that enables fault injection acceleration by 
leveraging the hardware-assisted platform. Additionally, Chapter 6 
describes the proposed methodology to connect the fault injection 
campaign to the ISO 26262 world through an FMEDA. Chapter 7 reports 
the experiments performed using an OpenRISC architecture, and it 
discusses the results achieved. At the end of Chapter 7, a high-level 
comparison between the proposed methodology and the most similar 
related work is made, which permits emphasizing the potential benefit of 
the proposed methodology. In conclusion, Chapter 0 summarizes the 
thesis research achievements and comments future work. 
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2. FUNCTIONAL SAFETY AND ISO 26262 INTRODUCTION 
 
2.1. ISO 26262 TERMINOLOGY AND SCOPE 
 
In a broad sense, safety is a dependability attribute that represents 
the probability of a system that cannot operate correctly any longer to 
interrupt its functions in a way that nothing catastrophic happens to the 
users and the environment [13]. The “absence of unreasonable risk due to 
hazards caused by malfunctioning behavior of E/E systems” is the 
definition of functional safety according to the ISO 26262 vocabulary 
[15]. A graphical interpretation of this definition is illustrated in Figure 1. 
In a vehicle, hazards can be due to mechanical, electrical or even 
hydraulic problems. ISO 26262 limits its concern to the malfunction 
behavior of Electric/Electronic and Programmable Electronic (E/E/PE) 
systems thus not including electrical shocks or any other source of risk.  
 
 
Figure 1 – Functional safety definition according to the ISO 26262. 
The ISO 26262 has its first nine parts – chapters of the standard – 
published late 2011 followed by the part ten in 2012. The standard on its 
first edition has series production passenger cars with maximum gross 
vehicle mass no greater than 3,500 Kg as intended scope of application 
[15]. The second edition of the ISO 26262 is planned to be released in 
2018 with wider scope by removing the vehicle mass limitation and also 
including a specific chapter for motorcycles [16]. This new edition is 
going to contain the part eleven that will cover the application of the 
standard concepts on semiconductors, which is vaguely considered in the 
“absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards caused
by malfunctioning behaviour of E/E systems”
unacceptable
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probability and 
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potential source of 
harm to people
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current release [17].  Until the official publication, the standard committee 
has periodically meetings to agree on the progressing draft of the ISO 
document, which is accessible for members – including OEMs, EDA 
vendors, safety consultants, and others. 
 
2.2. BRIEF HISTORY OVERVIEW AND LEGAL ASPECTS 
 
Functional safety has not been introduced by the automotive 
standard that drives the topic of this research. Aviation segment has the 
important DO-178 “Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and 
Equipment Certification” published in 1982, which matured to the DO-
178A – released in 1985 – and ten years later became the well-known 
DO-178B. At the same time, it has been developed the “Aerospace 
Recommended Practice” guidelines ARP4754A and ARP4761, which 
were published later in 1996 putting the system and safety assessment 
into place [18]. The hardware counterpart is the DO-254 that provides 
guidance to ensure safe operation of airborne electronic designs that was 
announced in 2000 [19]. In the same year, the remaining four parts of the 
IEC 61508 standard were released after the first three parts became 
available in 1998 [20]. Figure 2 shows some of the most well-known 
safety standards. 
The “functional safety of E/E/PE safety-related system” standard, 
or IEC 61508, is a “generic” standard, which served as the basis for 
drafting the functional safety guidelines tailored to different industry 
segments [21] – some indicated in Figure 2. Therefore, IEC 61508 
supported the creation of safety standards applied medical device 
software (e.g., IEC 62304), nuclear power plant systems (e.g., IEC 
61513), machinery control systems (e.g., IEC 62061), industrial processes 
(e.g., IEC 61511), railway application (e.g., EN 50126), and many others. 
This long list also includes ISO 26262 covering the automobile 
electronics. The draft international standard (DIS) of the ISO 26262, 
which is prepared by the committee before the official release, was 
published in 2009. The same year the “unintended acceleration” case with 
the Toyota Lexus ES 350 killed all four occupants and triggered an 
escalation of investigations, back to 2002, of driver’s complaints 
reporting similar problem [22]. The investigation found 89 deaths 
suspected to be caused by defects on the Electronic Throttle Control 
System (ETCS), but the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) – assigned to inspect the design – could not point to a specific 
design flaw. However, NASA reported many technical questionable 
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procedures and the jury, of the civil lawsuit against Toyota, was 
convinced that ETCS defects caused the deaths. Additional to millions of 
recalls and millionaire civil penalties, the carmaker was fined in more 
than a billion of dollars in 2014 [23]. To prevent such cases that the ISO 
26262 was created, similar to the IEC 61508, which was influenced by 
the lessons learned from tragedies like Bhopal in 1984, Chernobyl in 1986 
and Piper Alpha in 1988 [24].  
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Functional safety standards historic connection. 
Regulation bodies from nine countries – e.g., USA, Germany, 
Japan – engaged for more than eight years until publishing the first 
version of the ISO 26262 containing the state-of-the-art framework for 
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achieving functional safety [25] [26]. Despite the technical focus of the 
recommendations in the standard, there are circumstantial norms or legal 
aspects that cannot be ignored. For instance, according to the European 
Regulation 661/2009, the current state of science and technology must be 
used to design vehicle safety. This makes the ISO 26262 more than just a 
recommendation due to its contemporary functional safety guidelines. 
The Toyota “unintended acceleration” example and the liability risk 
shared across the OEMs and its suppliers together with the growing 
number of electronics integrated into the cars, made the automotive 
industry align and contribute to the ISO 26262. While the standard 
imposes additional effort of complying with a bundle of new 
requirements, it also serves as legal protection from unreasonable 
liability. Such protection can only be achieved if the designer can 
convince it has done its “best-effort” to assure safety [27]. This is 
supported by the Safety Case, which compiles all relevant functional 
safety information derived from the other work products – i.e., 
documentation – required by the ISO 26262. The Safety Case must clear 
state what is being claimed – i.e., scope, context and requirements – about 
the system, the evidence – e.g., work products, test reports – and the safety 
arguments that communicate the relationship between the evidence and 
what is claimed [28]. Additionally, best-effort evidence must be provided 
including the adoption of reasonable economic and technical measures to 
guarantee maximum safety. In other words, the “liability risk” translated 
into the “hazard potential” of the application is what establishes the “best 
effort” extent a supplier has to commit in order to determine the 
appropriate state-of-the-art to be used [29]. 
 
2.3. AUTOMOTIVE SAFETY LIFECYCLE 
 
The automotive safety lifecycle – see Figure 3 – is outlined in the 
ISO 26262. Part 2 of the standard describes requirements – e.g., 
competences, traceability, plans – that must be managed from 
development to decommissioning of the product, as well as pre-requisites 
for safety activities applicable to specific phases [30]. 
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Figure 3 – Automotive safety lifecycle according to the ISO 26262. 
The next five parts of the standard specify distinct stages of the 
ISO 26262. In Figure 4, the clauses that describe the subphases of each 
stage are indicated in the following manner: “part number”-“clause”. Part 
3 start requiring the definition of the item being considered, which 
correspond to features at the vehicle level like: 
 Electronic Throttle Control Systems (ETCS); 
 Electrical Hydraulic Power Steering (EHPS); 
 Advanced Driver Assisted System (ADAS); 
 Tire Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS); 
 Electronic Steering Column Lock (ESCL); 
 Electronic Stability Program (ESP); 
 Emergency Brake Assistant (EBA); 
 Antilock Braking System (ABS); 
 Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC); 
 Traffic Sign Recognition (TSR); 
 Electronic Parking Brake (EPB); 
 Electric Power Steering (EPS); 
 Steer-By-Brake (SBB); 
 X-By-Wire – i.e. X = Drive, Throttle, Brake, Steer, etc.  
After the item definition with regards to its functions, interfaces, 
use cases, the safety cycle is then initiated by identifying if the project 
corresponds to a new design, modification or a reuse of existing product 
in an automotive application. The hazard analysis and risk assessment 
(HARA) subphase comes next and the objectives are: 
 identify and categorize the hazards that malfunctions in the 
item can trigger; 
 determine the ASIL considering the estimate of severity, 
exposure and controllability probability factors of each 
hazardous event based on the provided item’s functional 
behavior; 
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 formulate the safety goals to prevent or mitigate the 
unreasonable risk of each hazardous events with an ASIL 
assigned. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 - Safety lifecycle subphases. (Adapted from ISO 26262) 
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2.4. ISO 26262 – CONCEPT PHASE EXERCISE 
 
A fault tolerant Drive-By-Wire (DBW) example is used here to 
demonstrate a HARA [31]. The example consists of a Steer-By-Wire 
(SBW), a Brake-By-Wire (BBW), and a Throttle-By-Wire (TBW) sub-
systems. The elements of the DBW system are: central control unit 
(CCU); brake, steer and throttle ECUs and actuators; communication bus; 
and the steer wheel, the pedals, and their sensors. The user interface shall 
permit the driver to control the speed and the steering angle of the vehicle 
through the interaction with the pedals and steering wheel, respectively. 
Therefore, the steer and speed control need to be able to turn and to 
regulate acceleration of the vehicle. Figure 5 diagram shows how the 
elements composing the DBW system interact.  
 
 
Figure 5 – The block diagram of the DBW example. (Source: [31]) 
2.4.1. Item Definition 
 
An example of item definition for the DBW system is shown in 
Table 1. The DBW definition contains the description of the intended 
functionality of the item, which is composed of the SBW, BBW, and 
TBW subsystems. 
 
Table 1 – Item definition of the DBW example with the subsystems functionality 
description. (Adapted from [31]) 
System Function Description of intended function 
SBW Steer control Control the steering angle of the vehicle 
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TBW Speed control Increase the speed of the vehicle 
BBW Speed control Decrease the speed of the vehicle 
 
The item definition shall also include operation modes, 
environment conditions, legal requirements (e.g., the drive legislation of 
the interesting regions), already known failure modes and hazards (e.g., 
from known safety-related incidents). Sufficient information must be 
provided in order to permit conducting the subsequent activities, which 
are the HARA and later the “Functional Safety Concept”.  
 
2.4.2. Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment 
 
The HARA starts by analyzing the operating situations – i.e., 
functional modes and environment constraints – on which an item’s 
malfunction will result in a hazardous event. Brainstorming, field studies, 
“Failure Mode Effects Analysis” (FMEA), among other techniques are 
used to systematically identify the as many as possible hazardous events 
and their consequences. Table 2 is a reduced version of the hazard 
identification done for the DBW system, but with a similar format used 
in the ISO 26262 guidelines.   
 
Table 2 – Hazardous event identification for the DBW example. (Adapted from 
[31]). 
ID 
Failure 
mode 
Hazardous Event Possible 
consequences Hazard Situation 
H01 
Throttle 
omission 
Sudden lack 
of throttle 
Low speed 
at crosslevel 
Rear end or 
train collision 
H02 
Throttle 
omission 
Sudden lack 
of throttle 
High-speed 
at motorway 
Rear end or  
side collision 
H03 
Brake 
commission 
Unexpected  
full brake 
High-speed at 
highway 
Traffic 
Accident 
H04 
Brake stuck  
at value 
Constant  
partial brake 
Avg. speed at 
main roads 
Loss of car 
stability 
H05 
Steer angle 
commission 
Unexpected  
strong veer 
Taking a bend 
at high-speed  
Loss of 
car control 
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All hazardous events identified in the exercise, which results in the 
Table 2 information, must be classified with respect to the severity, 
probability of exposure and controllability. All three classification 
parameters are estimated using a defined rationale. 
The failure mode corresponds to the manner in which an item or 
one of its elements fails. If an item’s failure mode occurs during a 
specified operational condition, then the worst-case scenario is 
considered as the possible consequence. Table 3 can be used to classify 
the severity of such consequences. The severity parameter has four 
classes that are associated with the different potential harm levels of the 
persons at risk, such as, drivers, passengers, cyclists, and pedestrians. 
 
Table 3 – Classes of severity according to the ISO 26262. 
Class Description 
S0 No injuries 
S1 Light and moderate injuries 
S2 Severe and life-threatening injuries (survival probable) 
S3 Life-threatening injuries (survival uncertain), fatal injuries 
 
Also, split into four classes, the controllability parameter relates to 
the probability of the driver or another person potentially at risk to gain 
control of the hazardous situation and avoid the harm. Therefore, the 
operating condition is analyzed, and the controllability classification is 
decided using the Table 4. 
 
Table 4 – Classes of controllability according to the ISO 26262. 
Class Description 
C0 Controllable in general 
C1 Simply controllable 
C2 Normally controllable 
C3 Difficult to control or uncontrollable 
 
The probability of exposure to the operational situation of the 
hazardous event is what defines the remaining parameter needed for the 
hazard classification. Table 5 has the five classes that distinguish the 
different probability levels of exposure.  
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Table 5 – Classes of exposure probability regarding operational situations 
according to the ISO 26262. 
Class Description 
E0 Incredible 
E1 Very low probability 
E2 Low probability 
E3 Medium probability 
E4 High probability 
 
2.4.3. Automotive Safety Integrity Level Determination 
 
Using Table 6 is possible then to determine the ASIL for each 
hazardous event identified.  
 
Table 6 – ASIL determination based on the hazardous classification parameters 
according to the ISO 26262. 
ASIL Classification Controllability 
Severity Exposure C1 C2 C3 
S1 
E1 QM QM QM 
E2 QM QM QM 
E3 QM QM A 
E4 QM A B 
S2 
E1 QM QM QM 
E2 QM QM A 
E3 QM A B 
E4 A B C 
S3 
E1 QM QM A 
E2 QM A B 
E3 A B C 
E4 B C D 
 
The ASIL has four different levels corresponding to the item’s or 
element’s requirements to be fulfilled in order to avoid an unreasonable 
risk. The levels are represented by the first four letters of the Latin 
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alphabet where A and D represent the least and the most stringent levels, 
respectively. Some hazardous event not even get the ASIL A assigned, 
and therefore, no additional requirement must be observed hence the 
Quality Management (QM) process already in place is sufficient. 
The hazardous events of the DBW example in Table 7 are derived 
from the operating situation and the hazard identified in Table 2. For each 
hazardous event, the classification parameters are defined thus permitting 
to assign correspondent ASIL according to Table 6. Notice that no further 
requirements must be observed for the hazardous events H01 and H02 of 
the DBW example, however, the ASILs D, B, and D levels were assigned 
to the Table 7 entries H03, H04, and H05, respectively. 
 
Table 7 – ASIL determination for the hazardous event identified DBW example. 
(Adapted from [31]) 
ID Hazardous Event Parameters ASIL 
H01 
Sudden lack of throttle at low speed 
passing over a rail cross 
S3,C2,E1 QM 
H02 
Sudden lack of throttle at high speed 
driving in a motorway 
S1,C1,E4 QM 
H03 
Unintended full brake applied while 
driving at highway speed limit 
S3,C3,E4 D 
H04 
Constant partial brake pressure suddenly 
applied when driving with main road speed 
S3,C2,E4 B 
H05 
Unintended strong veer off the direction at 
high speed in the highway 
S3,C3,E4 D 
 
2.4.4. Safety Goal Specification 
 
At least one top-level safety requirement, known as Safety Goal 
(SG), must be defined for those hazardous events that had an ASIL 
assigned – i.e., no less than A level. Therefore, SGs had to be defined only 
for the hazardous events H03, H04, and H05. The SG from the DBW 
example is shown in Table 8. Statements like the one highlight in SG01 
presumes highest possible reliability will be targeted [31]. SG01 is also 
used as an example of combining similar SG by keeping the highest ASIL 
level assigned. Additionally, an operating mode without the unreasonable 
level of risk can be specified by the SG, for example, the “safe state” 
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underlined in SG03 that needs to be achieved and maintained to prevent 
the possible harm.    
 
Table 8 – Safety goals defined for the hazardous events 
ID ASIL Safety Goals 
H03 D SG01 The brake functionality shall not fail 
H04 B 
SG01 The brake functionality shall not fail 
SG02 Warn the driver when at degraded function 
H05 D SG03 
The steer system needs to be stuck at value in case 
of failure, enabling SBB functionality 
 
2.4.5. Derivation of the Safety Requirements  
 
At the “functional safety concept” subphase, it is defined the 
Functional Safety Requirements (FSR) for each SG resulted from the 
HARA activity. An FSR specifies behaviors or measures that shall be 
implemented. The FSR specification can include the transitioning to the 
safe state to achieve, the fault tolerance time interval, the warning 
mechanisms (e.g., ABS warning lamp), the functional redundancies (e.g. 
SMs), and so forth. The FSRs must also be mapped to the corresponding 
system elements they apply. Table 9 contain some FSRs and the allocated 
elements from the DBW example. 
 
Table 9 – FSRs from the DBW example. (Adapted from [31]) 
ASIL SG Functional Safety Requirement 
D SG01 
FSR01 Distributed brakes BBW-ECU 
FSR02 CCU redundancy: HW/SW a CCU 
B SG02 FSR03 Interaction with the driver CCU 
D SG03 
FSR04 SSB technology BBW-ECU 
FSR05 Steer stuck at forward position SBW-ECU 
a Hardware and Software redundancy.  
 
The “product development at the system level” phase (see Figure 
4) also has the initialization exercise when it is specified functional safety 
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activities for the further subphases. One of the activities is to derive the 
Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) from the FSRs. The TSR shall 
specify the SM details, such as the detection, alarming and control of 
faults in the system, ways to achieve and maintain, measures to avoid or 
warn degradation. Subsystem elements can have TSRs derived from the 
TSRs allocated at the system level, and this can be iteratively done 
through the design hierarchy. Optionally, TSRs can be further refined into 
hardware (HWR) or software (SWR) safety requirements. 
 
2.4.6. Requirements Allocation through the Supply Chain 
 
Different from the IEC 61508, the ISO 26262 considers the typical 
automotive scenario where a system can be built with the elements 
provided by multiple companies in the supply chain of the OEM. 
Therefore, TSRs must be communicated through the companies. This 
communication is supported by the Development Interface Agreement 
(DIA) where the data to be exchanged between the customer, and the 
supplier is defined. The supply chain illustrated in Figure 6 highlight the 
importance of the DIA also protects the companies involved from 
unreasonable liability.  
 
 
 
Figure 6 – Automotive supply chain illustration. 
OEM
(e.g., DBW,HUD)
1st Tier – Supplier 
(e.g., TBW, SBW,ABS)
IP Supplier
(DSP, GPU, DDR etc.)
 2nd Tier – Supplier 
(e.g., Sensor, ECUs)
IC Supplier 
(FPGA, ASIC) 
Safe function
(Item)
Safe systems 
(equipment box)
Safe parts / subparts 
(CPU / registers)
Safe subsystems 
(circuit board)
Safe components 
(µC)
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The SGs with the determined ASIL, the FSRs and the derived 
TSRs at the vehicle level are typically defined by the OEM as indicated 
in Figure 7. If this data is not available, then they can be defined based on 
assumptions of usage (AoU) whenever a supplier is going to 
commercialize a generic subsystem as a safety element out of context 
(SEooC). 
An item as defined in the ISO 26262 can be composed of a 
hierarchy of systems, which the subsystem leafs are built by multiple 
components. These components are split into hardware parts (or software-
units) that can be further divided into sub-parts. Higher level TSRs are 
further refined across the system hierarchy throughout the supply chain 
by deriving new detailed TSRs. The leaf requirements are allocated to the 
components, for example, a software application or a microcontroller 
(µC). Such components may have specific requirements – i.e., HWR and 
SWR, respectively – that are derived from the leaf TSRs as illustrated in 
Figure 7. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 - Requirements communication throughout the supply chain. 
This complex multilevel requirements definition must be 
consistent and traceable in order to guarantee that no SG is overlooked. 
Additionally, the strictest ASIL level assigned to the SG must traverse 
together with the requirements, which are allocated to the components. 
Therefore, all FSR, TSR, HWR and SWR illustrated in Figure 7 must 
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FSR 1.1.1 (ASIL) FSR 1.1.2 (ASIL) ... FSR 1.1.N (ASIL)
TSR 1.1.1.1.1 (ASIL)
TSR 1.1.1.2 (ASIL) ...
HWR 1.1.1.1.1.1 (ASIL) SWR 1.1.1.1.1.2 (ASIL)
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have the same ASIL assigned to their parent SG (SG 1.1). This traversal 
assignment ensures that the correct safety measures are implemented in 
the required components. A microcontroller is an example of a complex 
component, which is subdivided into its major parts, for instance, a CPU, 
memory controller, and other peripherals. A part itself can be further split 
into subparts – e.g., arithmetic logic unit (ALU), debug interface, timer, 
and interruption controller. The component dismemberment allows 
achieving a stricter ASIL by evidencing the parts or the subparts – e.g., 
debug module interface – that are not S-R and hence can not contribute 
to the SG violation probability [28]. Moreover, this detailed analysis 
increases the confidence of the safety assessment. 
 
2.5. CHAPTER REMARKS  
 
This Chapter briefly discussed the liability impact on the “best-
effort” practiced by the OEMs and suppliers. The legal aspect pushes the 
companies in the supply chain always to consider state-of-the-art 
solutions like the one proposed in this research. The effort level commit 
by the companies is also based on the ASIL determined according to the 
identified hazardous event of the target application. Therefore, it is shown 
how the ASIL, which is defined for SG at the vehicle level, traverse with 
the safety requirements that are communicated by DIAs throughout the 
supply chain until getting allocated into hardware and software 
components. This standard overview is essential to understand the ASIL 
influence on the next subphases. The V-Model defined in the ISO 26262 
is illustrated in Figure 8, which shows how the activities are distributed 
in the V-Model flow. After starting the development of the hardware and 
software parts, verification is the next subphase, which is discussed in the 
following chapter. 
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Figure 8 – ISO 26262 V-Model illustration. (Adapted from ISO 26262) 
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3. FAULT INJECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF ISO 26262 
 
3.1. SAFETY ASSESSMENT BASIC CONCEPTS 
 
Failure probability imposes a great challenge with the advance of 
the process technology required to develop a complex systems-on-a-chip 
(SoC) with higher performance [14]. Fault avoidance through design 
inspection and testing processes are not enough to prevent failures due to 
aging or radiation effects during the system lifetime. Fault tolerance and 
fault diagnosis mechanisms are used to increase the reliability, thus 
allowing to develop robust circuits that fulfill the needs of critical 
applications. Such mechanisms are commonly implemented by using 
some kind of redundancy like replicated hardware, specific software 
routines, data parity, and others.   
 
3.1.1. Hardware Architectural Metrics 
  
The term “safety mechanism” is used in the ISO 26262 that 
embraces different fault tolerant mechanisms which can be employed in 
the safety device. The collection of SMs selected to integrate the design 
and to increase its reliability must be checked regarding their capability 
to prevent faults from propagating and violating SGs. The standard 
requires a rigorous analysis of the incidence probability of random faults 
in the hardware. The safety analysis uses a set of objective metrics in 
order to enable the audition by an external authority. The hardware 
architectural metrics allows to assessing if the selection of SMs 
implemented is sufficient to detect and or to control the failure rate 
proportion defined according to the ASIL assigned. Therefore, the single 
point faults metric (SPFM) and latent faults metric (LFM) percentages 
must be assessed.  
 
3.1.2. Fault Classification 
 
A single point fault (SPF) has the potential to directly violate an 
SG unlike the multi-point fault (MPF). However, an MPF that remains 
latent (MPFL), in combination to another independent fault, has the 
indirect potential to violate an SG. Naturally, SMs are first considered to 
cover as much SPFs as possible. Whenever an SM is used like this, the 
remaining uncovered SPFs are called residual faults (RF) hence with the 
same SPF characteristics – potential to directly violate an SG. Then, in 
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the presence of an SM, the residual SPFs become RFs, while the covered 
SPFs are called MPFs. Therefore, it is beneficial that SMs added to cope 
with SPFs can also diagnose as much MPFL as possible thus improving 
the LFM by increasing the number of latent faults that are detected 
(MPFD). There are faults which cannot directly violate an SG, but 
independently of the detection of an SM, their presence can be perceived 
by the driver that notices some performance degradation or any other 
problem indication like black smoke leaving the car exhaust. This kind of 
perceived multipoint fault (MPFP) is not considered at microcontroller 
level since it is not possible to judge the detection ability of the driver at 
this level [28].  
Notice that the violation of an SG by an MPF is typically 
associated with the occurrence of a second MPF, but no more than two 
faults – sometimes MPFs are even referred to as dual-point faults [28]. In 
general, a fault with the characteristics of an MPF, yet requiring two or 
more extra faults to be able to cause a violation, can be considered a safe 
fault (SF) – unless evidence during the safety concept shows otherwise. 
Faults considered SF shall not contribute to the violation of an SG.  
 
3.1.3. Failure Modes and Fault Models 
 
To overcome the SPF associated with a short circuit of a resistor, 
for example, three resistors in series can be used instead, thus allowing 
the short circuit of each resistor to be considered SFs [28]. The short 
circuit in this example represents one possible failure mode of a 
component like a resistor. Permanent and transient are common digital 
semiconductors failure modes hence they are considered in this research. 
The permanent failure mode is triggered by the occurrence of stuck-at-
faults (SAT) – i.e., a signal gets stuck-at-0 (SA0) or stuck-at-1 (SA1). On 
the other hand, single-event-transient (SET) and single-event-upset 
(SEU) faults, temporarily disrupt the normal functionality of 
combinatorial and sequential parts of a circuit, respectively. For that 
reason, the faults SET and SEU compose the transient failure mode. 
Notice that only random faults – i.e. during operational lifetime – are 
being considered since the systematic faults are covered by implementing 
and properly managing the safety activates throughout the safety 
lifecycle. 
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3.1.4. Failure Rate 
 
The probability of a component failure mode occurs is called the 
base failure rate (λ), and the unit is FIT (failure in time). One FIT 
corresponds to no more than a single failure within one billion operating 
hours – i.e. 109 h. The FIT budget is defined for the item SGs at the vehicle 
level according to the ASIL determined [32]. FIT rate targets are derived 
from the budget and allocated to the elements through the system 
hierarchy – similar to the derivation of safety requirements from the SGs. 
For example, Figure 9 illustrates the FIT budget for an ASIL D item that 
is communicated across the supply chain until defining the target FIT to 
be observed at the component level. In other words, the accumulative 
failure rate of those elements – i.e., parts and subparts of components – 
that contribute to the violation of an SG shall not surpass the FIT budget. 
This evaluation must be done in order to guarantee the probability to 
violate each SG is not exceeded – i.e., each SG’s FIT budget is observed. 
The assessment of the hardware architecture metrics and the SG violation 
probability due to random hardware failures is required in order to claim 
ISO 26262 compliance.   
 
 
 
Figure 9 – Allocating the target FIT budget to be observed in order to guarantee 
the probability to violate an SG is not exceeded at the vehicle level. 
3.1.4.1. Failure Rate Estimation 
 
The estimated base failure rate for semiconductors can be extracted 
from recognized industry sources like SN29500 and IEC/TR 62380 with 
respect to permanent faults, or from JEDEC standards like the JESD89 
for faults of the transient failure mode. Standards may provide too 
conservative numbers that do not represent the process and technology in 
place. Therefore, expert judgment, field experience, tests, and other inputs 
can also be used provided adequate confidence level on the statistics and 
approach employed to perform the estimations [32]. For complex 
components like microcontrollers, there may be parts which are not safe 
relate or SMs that cover only specific subparts of the design. In this case, 
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it makes senses to divide the design further into parts and subparts thus 
distributing the component base failure rate according to the area 
proportion occupied by microcontroller’s modules for example. The area 
figures are conservatively estimated at earlier stages, then, they are 
updated during the development process – e.g., whenever a GL netlist 
more mature becomes available. After allocating the base failure rate to 
each part and subpart of the component according to the failure modes, 
the hardware architectural metrics – i.e., SPFM and LFM – need to be 
calculated.  
 
3.1.4.2. Base Failure Rate Composition 
 
Figure 10 illustrate how it is composed the component base failure 
rate.   
 
 
 
Figure 10 – Component base failure rate split according to the classification of 
the faults of a certain failure mode. 
Safe Faults (λSF)
  – leads to a safe condition
  – does not contribute to the violation of SG
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  – detected multi point fault
  – prevented from violating a SG
Multi Point Fault – Latent (λLF)
  – MPF proportion not detected by the SMs
  – can lead to the safety goal violation
Residual Fault (λRF)
  – directly leads to the safety goal violation
  – SPF proportion not covered by the SM
Single Point Fault (λSPF)
  – directly leads to the safety goal violation
  – no SM implemented
Multi Point Fault – Perceived (λPF)
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Base
Failure
Rate
(λ)
Not Safe
Related
(not S-R)
λnSF
Not considered 
in the analysis
_not applicable_ 
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The possible faults of a failure mode, within the area of each part 
or subpart, must be individually classified into SF, SPF, RF, and MPF 
thus corresponding to proportions of the base failure rate – i.e., λSF, λSPF, 
λRF, and λMPF, respectively. The λMPF is split further according to the 
different MPF subcategories symbolized by λDF, λPF, and λLF as shown in 
Figure 10 – the acronyms DF, PF, and LF denote MPFD, MPFP, and MPFL 
and they are one-to-one interchangeable. The faults that can occur in an 
element, which is not S-R, are also considered SFs but are not taken into 
account for the safety analysis. Therefore, the base failure rate for each 
failure mode is calculated using (1).  
 
𝜆 = 𝜆𝑆𝐹 + 𝜆𝑆𝑃𝐹 + 𝜆𝑅𝐹 + 𝜆𝑀𝑃𝐹 (1) 
 
Where the MPF failure rate calculated in (2) is composed of the 
proportions corresponding to the amount of faults classified as perceived, 
latent, and detected. The perceived failure rate is not considered in the 
following equations since it is not applicable to the focus of this research 
– i.e., semiconductor level. 
 
𝜆𝑀𝑃𝐹 = 𝜆𝑃𝐹 + 𝜆𝐿𝐹 + 𝜆𝐷𝐹 (2) 
 
3.2. HARDWARE ARCHITECTURAL METRICS CALCULATION  
 
3.2.1. Failure Rate Proportions Matching the Fault Classification 
 
Each fault despite the failure mode – e.g., permanent or transient – 
can be classified using the flow diagram adapted from the ISO 26262 in 
Figure 11. The faults on an element that is not S-R, even if classified as 
safe faults, are not considered in the calculation. Notice that faults can 
only be tagged as SPF if no SM prevents any other fault from the same 
failure mode from directly violating an SG. In this case, when there is no 
SM to prevent SPFs, yet there can be faults that do not directly violate an 
SG, which shall be automatically tagged as latent faults unless there is an 
SM that only covers MPF faults. The arrow in Figure 11 indicates when 
a fault that does not directly violate an SG becomes an MPF and therefore 
can be either detected or classified as a latent fault.  
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Figure 11 – Fault classification illustration using dropping balls as faults that are 
distributed according to the answer to the question through the path.  
The fault classification analogy shown in Figure 11 utilizes balls 
symbolizing faults that are tagged and split into bins denoting the possible 
classifications. Given that all faults of a specific failure mode shall be 
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tagged, then the percentage of all balls found in each bin corresponds to 
the proportion of the failure rate associated with each classification. 
Figure 12 illustrates base failure rate shares related to the percentage of 
faults in each classification bin.  
 
 
 
Figure 12 – Failure rate shares associated with the proportion of faults classified 
in each group.  
The interface to the debug module of a microcontroller that is not 
used during the safety-related operation can have its failure rate marked 
as safe and its contribution to the hardware architecture metrics ignored, 
as already mentioned. However, there are faults in the inner logic of the 
debug unit that may have the potential to violate an SG hence need to be 
further classified into SPF, RF or MPF. Therefore, different from the 
interface, the debug inner logic cannot be considered not S-R. At the same 
time, faults in the inner logic that do not drive signals to the rest of the 
microcontroller shall be marked as safe, but the proportion of SF cannot 
be neglected because the element is S-R.  
 
3.2.2. Diagnostic Coverage and the Failure Rate Calculation 
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After finding the component’s parts and subparts not S-R, the 
safety analysis continues with the identification of SFs within S-R 
elements. For each S-R element, the further classification of the 
remaining faults is carried out differently given the presence or not of at 
least one SM. Without any SM, the faults which the effect propagates out 
the element are classified as SPFs and the rest as LF. If there is an SM 
that prevents at least one SPF, then all remaining SPFs are tagged as RFs. 
The percentage of faults prevented by an SM from directly violating an 
SG is called either failure mode coverage (FMC) or diagnostic coverage 
– i.e., DC. In this case, the capability of the SM to cover RFs is 
symbolized by DCRF percentage. Likewise, DCLF is the percentage of 
MPFs that are detected by the SM hence not allowing these faults to 
become LFs.  
 
3.2.2.1. Calculation Steps with Residual and Latent Faults Coverage 
 
Figure 13 illustrate the stepwise calculation of the base failure rate. 
 
 
 
Figure 13 – Calculation steps of the failure rate proportions when there is an SM 
that covers RFs as well as LFs. 
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The DCRF and the DCLF are percentages without a unit, so they can 
be used to either calculate the two corresponding failure rates fraction or 
to find the number of faults associated with each of these two 
classifications. The KRF and the KLF fractions correspond to the DCRF and 
DCLF percentages, respectively. Additionally, there is the failure rate 
fraction associated with the safe faults that are represented by FSF. Figure 
13 illustrates the steps for calculating the failure rate proportions of a 
given failure mode when there is an SM that can cover RFs and detect 
LFs. 
In Figure 13 the SFs failure rate fraction (λSF) has its counterpart 
indicated by λnSF. The λnSF given by (3) and the KRF are used to calculate 
the failure rates λMPF and λRF in (4) and (5), respectively. 
 
𝜆𝑛𝑆𝐹 = 𝜆 × (1 − 𝐹𝑆𝐹) (3) 
 
𝜆𝑀𝑃𝐹 = 𝜆𝑛𝑆𝐹 × 𝐾𝑅𝐹 (4) 
 
𝜆𝑅𝐹 = 𝜆𝑛𝑆𝐹 × (1 − 𝐾𝑅𝐹) (5) 
 
Next, in the calculation steps of Figure 13, the MPF failure rate 
(λMPF) is split into λDF and λLF using the LF DC fraction in the equations 
(6) and (7), respectively.  
 
𝜆𝐷𝐹 = 𝜆𝑀𝑃𝐹 × 𝐾𝐿𝐹 (6) 
 
𝜆𝐿𝐹 = 𝜆𝑀𝑃𝐹 × (1 − 𝐾𝐿𝐹) (7) 
 
3.2.2.2. Calculation Steps with Residual Fault Coverage 
 
Without an SM to prevent a fault from directly violating an SG, the 
λSPF needs to be calculated instead of the λRF. However, the λSPF and λMPF 
derivation from the λnSF can not be done using the KRF since there is no 
SM. Therefore, the standard represents as FPVSG, the failure rate fraction 
associated with the standalone faults with potential to violate the safety 
goal (PVSG) as shown in Figure 14.  
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Figure 14 - Calculation steps of the failure rate proportions associated with SPF 
and MPF when the SM only detects LF. 
In the situation illustrated in Figure 14, the λSPF and λMPF are given 
by (8) and (9), respectively. The λDF and λLF failure rates in Figure 14 are 
calculated in the same way as in the situation from Figure 13 since there 
is an SM responsible for the detection of the MPFs. 
 
𝜆𝑀𝑃𝐹 = 𝜆𝑛𝑆𝐹 × (1 − 𝐹𝑃𝑉𝑆𝐺) (8) 
 
𝜆𝑆𝑃𝐹 = 𝜆𝑛𝑆𝐹 × 𝐹𝑃𝑉𝑆𝐺  (9) 
 
3.2.2.3. Calculation Steps without Residual or Latent Faults Coverage 
 
For the sake of completeness, Figure 15 illustrates the situation 
where there is no SM whatsoever thus making λLF equal to λMPF. It is 
important to notice that in each situation, the failure rates λSPF and λRF are 
not used together. Since the base failure rate given by (1) considers λSPF 
and λRF, then whenever one is applicable the other one must be zero on 
each situation.  
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Figure 15 – Calculation steps of the failure rate proportions associated with SPF 
and MPF for the situation without any SM in place. 
3.2.3. Hardware Architectural Metrics Computation 
 
The calculations steps shall be done for each part or subpart of the 
component being analyzed. After that, the component’s hardware 
architectural metrics SPFM and LFM can be calculated. Therefore, to 
enable the calculation of SPFM and LFM, the following tasks must be 
performed: 
 Split the component into (sub)parts for the safety analysis; 
 Identify the applicable failure modes – e.g., permanent;  
 Distribute the component’s base failure rate to each element 
corresponding to its area occupation proportion; 
 Determine whether each element is S-R or not;  
 Verify the percentage of safe faults if any; 
 Indicate whether there are SMs in place; 
 Collect the DCRF and DCLF of the SMs in place; 
 Derive the λLF and λSPF or λRF from the base failure rate; 
 Calculate the component’s total Σ(λLF) and Σ(λSPF) or Σ(λRF); 
 Compute the SPFM and LFM given by (10) and (11). 
 
𝑆𝑃𝐹𝑀 = 1 −
∑(𝜆𝑆𝑃𝐹 + 𝜆𝑅𝐹)
∑ 𝜆
 (10) 
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Notice that the λSPF and λRF are subtracted from the total failure rate 
in (11) because the faults that directly violate an SG are not latent 
anymore thus cannot contribute to LFM. Additionally, it is important to 
highlight that the greater the FSF, the better provided the base failure rate 
given by (1) hence justifying a more detailed safety analysis for some 
cases. 
 
𝐿𝐹𝑀 = 1 −
∑(𝜆𝐿𝐹)
∑(𝜆 − 𝜆𝑆𝑃𝐹 − 𝜆𝑅𝐹)
 (11) 
 
The SPFM and LFM target values to achieve are established by the 
ASIL determined to the SG, which the probability of violation is being 
analyzed. Table 10 shows the target reference values defined in the ISO 
26262 standard. This qualitative detailed safety analysis is only applicable 
for SG with ASIL higher than A. 
   
Table 10 – SPFM and LFM target values. (Source ISO 26262). 
Metrics ASIL B C D 
𝑆𝑃𝐹𝑀 = 1 −
∑(𝜆𝑆𝑃𝐹 + 𝜆𝑅𝐹)
∑ 𝜆
 ≥ 90 % ≥ 97 % ≥ 99 % 
𝐿𝐹𝑀 = 1 −
∑(𝜆𝐿𝐹)
∑(𝜆 − 𝜆𝑆𝑃𝐹 − 𝜆𝑅𝐹)
 ≥ 60 % ≥ 80 % ≥ 90 % 
 
3.3. FAILURE MODE EFFECTS, AND DIAGNOSTIC ANALYSIS 
 
At initial phases of the safety lifecycle, an FMEA can be performed 
in order to describe the item’s function, identify and classify the 
hazardous events to determine the ASIL, which becomes assigned to the 
SGs defined to avoid unreasonable risk. An FMEA tool is normally based 
on complex spreadsheet or database where all the aforementioned data is 
entered through the FMEA worksheets [33]. This kind of qualitative 
analysis does not consider the failure rate or DC metrics [34]. Therefore, 
the quantitative evaluation of the safety metrics is commonly supported 
by an extended FMEA, named “Failure Mode Effects, and Diagnostic 
Analysis” (FMEDA). 
Table 11 shows a worksheet based on the microcontroller FMEDA 
example given in the ISO 26262 part [28]. The Table 11 FMEDA uses 
informative entry values for the sake of the calculation demonstration. 
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The part and subpart of the microcontroller analyzed are the CPU and its 
ALU instance. The permanent and transient failure modes are considered 
for the ALU subpart. The microcontroller has two SMs in place. The 
mechanism number one (M1) is a monitor of the CPU that can detect 
faults which cause the software to run out of sequence. The M2 is SBST 
executed at key-on – i.e., vehicle startup – to detect latent faults. Any fault 
detected by M1 or M2 activates an output signal of the microcontroller 
and a system level requirement shall be specified to make proper use of 
this signal – e.g., go to a safe state or alarm the driver. M1 can also detect 
transient faults hence the CPU can be reset in order to resume the fault-
free state. If the error persists after reset, then the fault is considered 
permanent. Thus the FMEDA has no LF entry for the transient failure 
mode. No SPF entry appears in the example because there are SMs for all 
failure modes. If a subpart without any SM is added to the FMEDA, then 
its row would have 0% as DCPRF, and the failure rate associated with the 
SPF could be placed in the λPRF column. This is possible because λPSPF and 
λPRF are complementary with respect to the contribution to the SPFM and 
LFM calculations given by (10) and (11), respectively.  
  
Table 11 – Microcontroller FMEDA examples adapted from the ISO 26262. 
Design (µC) 
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 Y P 25 20 M1 90 2 M2 60 7.2      
Y T         15 20 M1 90 1.2 
Totals  Σ(λP)  Σ(λPRF)  Σ(λPLF)  Σ(λT)  Σ(λTRF) 
a The Failure Modes (FM) considered are Permanent (P) and Transient (T). The 
initial letters are used to mark the entries associated with each FM.  
b The example has two SMs with the reference names: M1, which can cover 
permanent and transient residual faults; and M2 that detects latent faults. 
 
After the Table 11 is complete with all relevant parts and subparts 
of the microcontroller, then the summations Σ(λP) and Σ(λPRF) can be used 
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in (10) to calculate the microcontroller’s SPFM associated with the 
permanent failure mode. The same can be done with Σ(λT) and Σ(λTRF) to 
calculate the SPFM for transient faults. To find the LFM, the summation 
Σ(λPLF) together with Σ(λP) and Σ(λPRF) can be used in (11). Notice that 
such detailed analysis provided by FMEDA tools allows identifying 
which parts or subparts that most contribute to the total failure rate or that 
need a higher DC thus allowing to specify new requirements to achieve 
the SPFM and LFM requisites.  
The Appendix D in the ISO 26262 – Part 5 [32] shows the generic 
hardware of an embedded system – e.g., power supply, clock, digital and 
analog I/O, and specific to semiconductors there are: ALU, register bank, 
interrupt handling, etc. For each generic element, the standard provides 
the common SMs and their typical achievable DC for different failure 
modes of the element. This start point information can be used as 
guidance for the selection of the SM and the target DC to achieve in order 
to comply with the SPFM and LFM derived from the ASIL. However, the 
techniques mentioned in Appendix D are not exhaustive, and other SM 
might be used. Additionally, there are constraints that the appendix cannot 
entirely consider when evaluating the DC of a generic SMs – e.g., the 
quality of the self-test executed by SBST, the periodicity that an SM shall 
be triggered to diagnose LF. Therefore, any kind of SM can be used 
provided evidence that corroborates the DC claimed.  
 
3.4. RELATED WORK: FAULT INJECTION APPLICATION 
 
Fault injection is broadly accepted to evaluate the response of a 
circuit in the presence of faults [35]. Thus, it plays a key role as a method 
to verify fault tolerance techniques integrated into the design of resilient 
systems. ISO 26262 strongly recommends fault injection to evaluate the 
completeness and correctness of the SMs for the higher ASILs – i.e., C 
and D. The same level of recommendation, independent of the ASIL, 
applies to the functional verification of the SMs. At SoC level, some SMs 
may only be triggered by the injection of a fault in the system since an 
external TB can not directly control SoC’s internal subparts’ inputs and 
outputs. Additionally, constraints like “Fault Reaction Time” and “Fault 
Tolerant Time Interval” must be verified to assure compliance with the 
requirements. Figure 16 illustrates the mentioned SMs’ time constraints. 
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Figure 16 – SM’s time constraints. (Adapted from ISO 26262). 
Yogitech S.p.A is a member of the technical committee for the ISO 
26262, and it has announced to be the lead of the ISO 26262 Part 11 [36]. 
This company provides state-of-the-art solutions for semiconductor 
safety design including fault injection campaign to verify DC. The 
academic contributions [37] [38] [39] from the Yogitech staff give a 
detailed introduction with regard the usage of fault injection to assess 
safety at semiconductor level. On the other hand, DC verification based 
on fault injection is not well promoted in the ISO 26262 standard. 
Yogitech is a safety consultant company experienced on guiding the 
customers throughout the safety certification process, therefore, its 
published research permits to better understand how fault injection is used 
within the safety context. Meanwhile, it serves as a reference material 
until ISO 26262 – Part 11 is not officially released, which will bring more 
details on fault injection and other particularities of safety application at 
semiconductors level. 
Yogitech indicates how the DC verification is performed using 
fault injection in [37], but the hardware architectural metrics calculated 
based on the IEC 61508 – not equal to the ISO 26262 metrics. The 
certification body TÜV SÜD has approved the so-called 
“fRMethodology” presented. A “sensitive zone” is an identified site of 
the design in which the faults within its input cone converge, henceforth, 
leading to the activation of failure mode – see the sensitive zone 
illustration [38] in Figure 17. The design is partitioned into sensitive 
zones, and their failure rates are calculated and stored in an FMEDA 
database. The base failure rates of the gates within sensitive zone cones 
are defined according to the failure mode – e.g., permanent in glue logic 
during power-up/down or normal operation, transient in registers or logic. 
The number of gates extracted from the IC description and their 
elementary failure rates among other parameters – e.g., frequency of use 
(only for transient) and DC – are stored in the database too. This 
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information is used to calculate the hardware architectural metrics of the 
IEC 61508. Next, fault injection is used to validate the FMEDA database. 
Evidence that the workload – i.e., TB and tests – used is appropriate needs 
to be provided in order to guarantee the sensitive zones are properly 
stimulated while injecting the faults. Coverage collection, the number of 
faults injected, test’s run-time, and other profiling information are used to 
check the confidence of the fault campaign results. 
 
 
 
Figure 17 - Sensitive zone illustration (Source: [38]). 
Prior the ISO 26262 release, Yogitech was already working on DC 
assessment based on fault injection at semiconductor level [38]. In 
collaboration with the Politecnico di Torino, a new tool was proposed 
considering the requirements specified by IEC 61508 for safety-related 
systems [39]. The tool is intended to work with any functional verification 
environment, regardless the EDA tools available. The goal of the 
presented solution is to enable the verification of SMs at different 
abstraction levels by leveraging the functional simulators used in the 
verification environment. For that reason, the fault models had to be 
implemented according to the existing tools on each environment setup 
due to the lack of fault injection support by the standard simulators 
available at that time [40]. In the tool proposal, an example of the SEU 
model is provided using the Functional Verification Language e (IEEE 
1647) for verification flows containing the Incisive® Specman® Elite. 
Figure 18 shows the Fault injection environment proposed in [39]. 
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Figure 18 – Fault injection environment proposed in [39]. 
After the FMEA is available, the SMs are implemented, and the 
sensitive zones are extracted, two other fault campaign elements are 
defined: the observation and the diagnostic points. There are monitors for 
these elements and also for the sensitive zones – in Figure 18, they are 
referred as OBSE, DIAG, and SENS monitors, respectively. The faults 
within the sensitive zone’s cone that do not trigger the SENS monitor are 
irrelevant for the analysis since they do not perturb the functionality. On 
the other hand, the number of faults, which propagate through the SENS 
until the OBSE monitors, contribute to the fraction of dangerous faults. 
Therefore, special registers or primary outputs of the design under test 
(DUT) are commonly selected as observation points. The DIAG monitors 
are typically located at the output of the SMs thus providing the 
information of which faults were covered by the diagnostic functions 
implemented in the DUT. 
The golden – i.e., fault free – instance of the DUT is executed in 
parallel to the faulty instance, and both share the same workload stimulus. 
The workload selected is either device or mission oriented – i.e., for 
generic usage of the device or a specific application, respectively. When 
the former kind of workload is selected, then the number of faults to inject 
can be reduced by not considering parts of the circuit that are not used by 
the application. With the workload defined, the fault-free run is analyzed 
in order to identify the most suitable moments to inject the faults – e.g., 
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assure that the transient faults injected in a memory element precede a 
read access hence the effect can propagate before being override by a 
write command. The workload completeness is measured by the amount 
of SENS and OBSE monitors that are excited at least once This is done 
by enabling toggle coverage where the monitors are located [38].  
For each fault, the simulation stops at the injection time, then the 
fault model is executed, and the simulation run continues until the test 
finishes. At the same time, the OBSE and DIAG monitors keep collecting 
data that will be analyzed after all faults are injected in order to calculate 
the DC. However, an exhaustive analysis is typically not feasible, hence 
only a set of all faults can be injected. Therefore, it is important to select 
the optimal fault candidates thus avoiding the injection of faults that have 
no effect. The experiments show that the fault list generation based on the 
workload profile reduced the number of faults to inject by 50%. The test 
case used is a simple router with one input and three possible output 
channels to where the data packets can be routed. Each channel has a 
buffer working as a queue with 16 words of 8 bits. Table 12 shows that 
the router design has 9,648 fault candidates [39]. After analyzing the 
workload, the set of faults to be injected was reduced to only 4,886 faults.  
 
Table 12 – Average fault injection time of the experiments on [39]. 
Design 
description 
Number  
of faults 
Average fault 
injection time 
Router (without optimization)  9,648 4.1s 
Router (50% fault set reduction) 4,886 3.7s 
32-bit RISC Processor 25,000 56.6s 
 
Eleven hours of simulation time were necessary to inject all faults 
while the optimized set of faults took about five hours to complete [39]. 
This overall time corresponds to 4.1 and 3.7 seconds, respectively, to the 
average simulation time for each fault injection – see Table 12. Although 
the overall time is drastically reduced, the optimization does not provide 
a significant improvement on the average fault injection time. Additional 
experiments with the tool presented have been done during the validation 
of real safety critical design based on a 32-bit RISC processor. Table 12 
shows that 25 thousand faults were selected to be injected – the original 
number of fault candidates was not disclosed. In this example, the average 
simulation time required for each fault injection was almost one minute. 
Thus showing that the fault simulation time is independent to the 
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optimization presented. Another relevant consideration is that the tool 
reuses the available functional verification tools in order to minimize the 
flow setup time. 
The Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) in 
collaboration with the National Tsing Hua University has also published 
their experience on DC assessment based on fault injection [41]. While 
discussing the related works, the paper reaches a common understanding 
“that the description of the probabilistic hardware metrics in ISO 26262 
is intrinsically not easy to follow”. Additionally, it highlights that other 
researches in the literature do not disclose how the safety evaluation is 
performed, which support the proof for claimed ASIL achieve. For 
instance, the “safety analysis report” – with the component’s FMEDA –  
of the ISO 26262 certified microprocessors from Texas Instruments Inc. 
(TI) cannot be accessed without a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) [42]. 
More details about the TI’s safety evaluation are only available to 
customers who require tailored safety analysis according to the target 
application.  
Given the lack of references, the ITRI limits its paper contribution 
on reporting their experience on the functional safety assessment of a 
MIPS-like microprocessor. Therefore, no kind of optimization or novel 
methodology is proposed. However, its detailed description provides 
deep insight on how the DC evaluation can be performed when 
considering the permanent failure mode. The TetraMAX ATPG suite is 
used to inject SAT faults in order to validate the initially estimated 
hardware architecture metrics what refers to the permanent failure mode. 
The paper provides a snippet from the SN 29500, which is used to perform 
the base failure rate estimation of the microprocessor subparts. Table 13 
contains the data from the SN 29500 snippet.   
 
Table 13 – SN 29500 hardware failure rate estimation. (Adapted from [41]) 
# Gates ≤ 1K ≤ 10K ≤ 100K ≤ 1M in °C 
CMOS 25    50 
CMOS  30   60 
CMOS   50  70 
CMOS    80 80 
 
Each subpart of the MIPS-like component gets a base failure rate 
derived from Table 13 according to their number of gates. However, the 
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2004 version of the SN 29500 standard provides more conservative 
estimations than the reliability data found in more recent standards [28]. 
Therefore, deriving the failure rate for each subpart from Table 13 can 
result in an overall failure rate too conservative. Alternatively, the SN 
29500 could be used to calculate the overall base failure rate, which then 
is allocated to the subparts according to their percentage of gates relative 
to the whole component. Table 14 was prepared to highlight the 
difference between the two mentioned approaches of estimating the base 
failure rate. Even using the former calculation approach, the numbers are 
still ten times more conservative than the failure rates utilized in a similar 
example found in the ISO 26262 [28]. 
 
Table 14 – Two different approaches for calculating the base failure rate using 
the conservative SN 29500 reliability data. 
Block Gates Base Failure Rate (FIT) 
Source data [41] 
Estimated for 
each subpart 
Derived from the 
overall estimation 
Register File 1,209 30 a 1.066 
Instruction memory 27,192 50 a 23.977 
Decode unit 128 25 a 0.113 
ALU 208 25 a 0.183 
Data memory 27,186 50 a 23.972 
Write-back unit 35 25 a 0.031 
Pipeline register 746 25 a 0.658 
                     Totals 56,704 230 50 a 
a failure rates calculated based on the SN 92500 data. 
 
Another usage of fault injection in the safety context is the 
evaluation of dependent failures [43]. For example, faults on the clock or 
reset signals can result in a “common cause failure” (CCF) of the 
redundant parts of a system. Therefore, the possible CCFs must be 
identified since the associated faults can have a global impact on a large 
area of the component [38]. Fault injection using higher level design 
description can support the identification of CCF [44]. However, this is 
out of the scope here. 
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3.5. CHAPTER REMARKS 
 
This chapter presented how the fault injection appears in the ISO 
26262 context. After the component’s FMEDA is complete, the subparts 
base failure rates are allocated, and the expected SMs’ DC are defined, it 
is possible to calculate the hardware architectural metrics. Fault injection 
is then used to validate the FMEDA results by evaluating the DC 
estimated. However, ISO 26262 does not provide technical details on how 
this evaluation shall be performed. Additionally, this process is typically 
tight to the design application and the verification environment available. 
Therefore, details about the fault injection based on DC evaluations at 
semiconductor level on real designs are not common in the literature since 
it would disclose too much information about the design and the setup 
used. In the next Chapter, the dedicated functional verification machine 
is introduced. The DC evaluation approach proposed leverages this 
dedicated platform to accelerate the fault injections. However, not all 
faults can be accelerated without modifying the design description, so the 
next chapter also describes the algorithm developed to select suitable 
faults to run on the dedicated platform.  
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4. FAULT INJECTION CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 
 
As already mentioned, safety – main focus on this research – is just 
one of the attributes that are encompassed by the dependability concept 
[45]. The attributes together with the threats and means are the three 
elements that compose the tree shown in Figure 19, which is traditionally 
used to summarize the dependability concept even nowadays [46].  
 
 
Figure 19 – Dependability tree. (Sources: [45] [46]). 
In order to avoid unreasonable risk and hence provide functional 
safety, SMs are added to the design as means of mitigating the 
dependability threats, which are: faults, errors, and failures. Figure 20 
illustrates how the threats correlate, and it also contains a synthesis of the 
most common definition for fault, error, and failure found in the literature 
[47] [45] [48] [13] [46].  
 
 
 
Figure 20 – Summarized dependability threats explanation found on [47] [45] 
[48] [13] [46].  
The correlation between fault, error, and failure presented in 
Figure 20 can be replicated for each abstraction level in order to 
exemplify how faults in the component level can lead to vehicle failures, 
as shown in Figure 21. Common practices of systematic faults prevention 
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are coding guidelines, specification review, code/functional verification 
coverage, manufacturer tests, among others means. Memory protection 
and SMs based on some kind of redundancy are examples of techniques 
used to tolerate random faults during the operation lifetime. When there 
is an error that could not be corrected, then it is important that the system 
fails in a safe manner thus reaching a predictable, and safe state – e.g., a 
redundant shut-off of the cruise control system [49]. 
 
 
 
Figure 21 – Dependability threats at different level (adapted from [50]).  
4.1. TRANSIENT FAULTS  
 
At digital semiconductor level, permanent and transient are the two 
failures modes that most appear in the ISO 26262 hence also considered 
here – as pointed out before. The history shows that the technology 
scaling has a significant impact on the circuit vulnerability against single-
event-effects (SEE) caused by radioactive particles even for applications 
operating at sea level [51]. Differently, of a hard error that results in 
permanent damage, a soft-error is a reversible upset of a circuit element, 
which is the consequence of a SEE fault, such as, SEU and SET – hence 
the failure mode name “transient” that encompasses these kinds of faults. 
Figure 22 shows the electron-hole pairs generated by the particle strike at 
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a sensitive node such as the drain of an OFF-transistor in a CMOS circuit 
[52] [53] [54] [55]. Therefore, the charge collected by the particle strike 
can generate a positive or negative voltage pulse depending whether the 
particle hits an OFF-PMOS or an OFF-NMOS, respectively. Figure 22 
illustrates a CMOS inverter with the input connected to the ground, hence 
its output remains high until a SET fault hits the OFF-transistor of the 
combinatorial gate producing a voltage glitch. 
 
 
 
Figure 22 – Voltage glitch at the output of logical gate caused by a SET fault 
(adapted from [52] [53] [54]). 
The glitch duration, for example, can determine whether a SET can 
become a soft-error via the fault effect capture by a storage element – e.g., 
memory cell, flip-flop, latch. Not all particles have the energy to cause 
transient faults and not all SET can result in a soft-error since its 
propagation can be masked due to logical, electrical or timing reasons – 
e.g., SET propagation falls outside the flip-flop latching window [52] 
[56]. On the other hand, an SEU fault corresponds to a particle that hits a 
storage element directly instead and bit-flip (upset) its content. Therefore, 
an SEU fault always results into a soft-error provided its effect deviates 
the correct behavior of a sequential circuit element. For that reason, the 
SEU term is often found in the literature being ambiguously used as a 
synonym for soft-errors [51].   
 
4.2. PERMANENT FAULTS 
 
There are SEEs which may persist until the circuit is reset or even 
cause irreversible damage, thus resulting in a hard-error – e.g., single 
event latchup (SEL). In addition to radiation effects, manufacturing 
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defects and circuit aging are also related to permanent – and intermittent 
– faults that can lead to hard-errors [35]. With the continuous technology 
scaling, new IC designs do not only need to cope with the vulnerability to 
transient faults, but also consider the device lifetime, which tends to wear-
out early, and the residual defects that escape manufacturing tests due to 
the transistor density [57] [58] [59]. Among the permanent faults, the 
most well-known fault model is SAT, which covers many physical 
defects [60] [61]. Safety-related researches and the ISO 26262 standard 
suggest that some techniques for SAT faults – e.g., N-detect and gate-
exhaustive – are used to detect other common permanent fault models like 
bridging or stuck-open at transistor switch level [28] [37]. Therefore, any 
optimization of the SAT fault injection can be beneficial to other SAT 
based techniques. 
SAT faults account for many transistor level faults that can be 
modeled at GL by making an input, or an output of a gate stuck at a 
constant value, either logic 0 (SA0) or logic 1 (SA1) [62]. Figure 23 
illustrates a multiplexer (MUX) at GL in order to highlight the locations 
where the SAT faults shall be considered according to the industry 
compatible fault model [63]. This compatibility mode includes SAT 
faults in the primary inputs (PI) and primary outputs (PO) of the circuit. 
The MUX example presented has 15 fault sites (or nodes) thus 
corresponding 30 SAT faults in total. In Figure 23, the circuit considered 
has a MUX implemented connected directly to the PIs and POs, hence 
eight SAT faults are associated with the primary ports of the circuit.  
 
 
 
Figure 23 – MUX circuit with all possible SA0 and SA1 faults indicated. 
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4.2.1. Fault activation and propagation concepts 
 
Fault coverage corresponds to the number of faults that can be 
detected by the manufacturing test, thus providing the quality of the 
selected test set. However, even after the simplification achieved with 
SAT fault model in comparison to transient faults, the number of faults to 
be detected can be too many for a complex circuit. Collapsing and 
testability analysis are optimizations used to reduce the SAT fault-set. 
Testability analysis statically checks if there are SAT faults which always 
produce the same output as a fault-free circuit – i.e., there is no possible 
test that can detect these faults. For a fault to be testable, it must be 
possible to activate and then propagate its effect to an observation point 
– e.g., a primary output. A fault can be activated when there is a test 
capable of driving the value opposite to the one which the fault node is 
stuck-at. After activation, the fault effect must not be masked in order to 
propagate until a detection point. Figure 24 illustrates the activation and 
propagation concepts.  
 
 
 
Figure 24 – Activation and propagation concepts.  
In Figure 24, an SA0 fault occurs on one input of the AND gate, 
and consequently, the gate’s output gets fixed to ‘0’. The SA0 effect at 
the AND gate output can only be noticed when the inputs are set to ‘1’, 
what would make a fault-free AND gate to output ‘1’, and not zero as 
shown in the example. For this to happen, the fault must be activated by 
driving ‘1’ to the gate’s input where the SA0 is located. Additionally, the 
fault effect shall be able to propagate, which means that the stimuli to the 
other inputs of the gate should not block the SA0 effect. On the other 
hand, there are some cases which the activation or propagation are not 
possible as shown in Figure 25.  
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Figure 25 – Untestable faults (adapted from [63]).  
4.2.2. Fault collapsing and testability 
 
The untestable faults correspond to possible faults in the circuit 
model which no test that can make the fault detected at an observation 
point. The reasons for that can be: SAT with the same value of a tied node, 
hence never activate; a SAT located on an unused logic thus cannot 
propagate to anywhere; and the existence of redundant logic, which can 
block the propagation of the SAT fault. In the end, untestable can be 
deleted from the list of faults to detect [63].  
 
 
 
Figure 26 – Local fault collapsing rules at GL (adapted from [62]).  
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Also looking to reduce the fault set, collapsing techniques group 
faults that produce identical (or equivalent) effect at the output thus being 
indistinguishable from each other. In other words, there is no test that can 
independently detect each fault from the equivalent group. For instance, 
if one fault of the group is detected, then it means that all equivalent faults 
are also detected. Collapsing can reduce the fault set by 50 to 60% [64]. 
Figure 26 illustrates the gate-oriented fault collapsing rules. 
Figure 26 identifies which faults are collapsible – i.e., equivalent 
faults are connected by a dashed line – within the basic element of a 
circuit described at GL. One of the equivalent faults must be selected to 
represent its group after collapsing. Therefore, after reduction of the faults 
due to collapsing, the fault towards the circuit output is selected from the 
equivalent group. The selected fault to represent its equivalent group is 
called the prime fault.   
 
4.2.3. Collapsing exercise and the backward propagation requisite 
 
The rules in Figure 26 applicable to gates, highlight which faults 
are logically equivalent. These rules are different from the “1-1 LINE” 
rule, which collapses “redundant” faults added by the industry compatible 
SAT fault model. For that reason, the gate-oriented collapsing starts with 
the “1-1 LINE” being applied. The result of the “1-1 LINE” rule in the 
MUX example is presented in Figure 27. 
 
 
 
Figure 27 – Applying “1-1 LINE” collapsing rule in the MUX example.  
After removing the “redundant” faults, each line segment in the 
circuit – where “1-N lines” is equal to N+1 segments – has a fault pair 
thus totalizing 18 SAT faults as shown in Figure 28. Next, the logic 
collapsing rules can be applied to the MUX circuit thus further reducing 
the fault set. 
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Figure 28 – Applying the logic collapsing rules in the MUX example.  
Figure 29 shows that after collapsing, the final fault set for the 
MUX example contains only ten faults, representing the 30 faults initially 
considered.  
 
 
 
Figure 29 – Final set of SAT faults after collapsing. 
In Figure 29, it is important to notice also that the SAT fault pair 
located in between the circuit’s PI and the line split, is prevented from 
being collapsed by the “1-N LINE” rule provided in Figure 26. This rule 
assures that the SAT fault model is observed, that is, the effect of the SA1 
fault at g3.A shall not backward propagate and reach the gate g1. In other 
words, the line driving a SAT fault node must be disconnected – or 
isolated – as illustrated in Figure 29 [63]. The magnifier in this figure 
highlights an analogy of an SA1 fault isolation done by disconnecting the 
SAT fault input from the original driver and then connecting to VCC. The 
fault isolation concept is relevant for the methodology presented. 
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4.3. FAULT INJECTION TECHNIQUES 
 
The semiconductor industry has extensively accepted fault 
injection over the years, and its tradition comes either from the DfT field 
or the know-how of robust circuit designs [40] [35]. Fault grading or fault 
simulation is a well-known fault injection application, where the goal is 
to determine the fault coverage of a given test set in order to guarantee 
that most defective devices do not escape the manufacturing tests. 
Another common usage of fault injection is for the verification of fault-
tolerant techniques used for hardening the circuit design. Today, there are 
many fault injection solutions not just targeting this two most common 
application, but different use cases also. For example, testbench (TB) 
qualification (TB-Q) explores fault injection in order to expose bugs in 
the checking – e.g., assertions, coverage bins, transactions – implemented 
in the verification environment [65]. Functional safety is another use case, 
where the ISO 26262 recommends fault injection with different semantics 
across the safety lifecycle. In this former usage of fault injection, the goals 
can be for instance evaluation of the hardware architectural metrics and 
DC assessment as already discussed in this research.  
The different fault injections techniques found in the literature are 
commonly classified by the design representation type that underlies the 
fault injection approach [66] [48] [35] [14] [67]. Therefore, the fault 
injection can be based on: 
 Hardware – it relies on the existence of the product prototype 
where the faults are physically inserted by forcing faulty 
conditions through the device pins or at specialized facilities 
with access to radiation or laser equipment to reproduce 
hostile environments; 
 Software – applicable to data processing designs, where some 
hardware faults can be imitated as software errors like 
incorrect instruction code, wrong transaction sequence, 
invalid message payload, etc.; 
 Simulation – widely used technique, where a simulation tool 
is employed to inject faults in the design model at different 
abstraction levels (e.g., RTL and GL) thus not requiring a 
prototype available; 
 Emulation – commonly based on configurable devices like 
FPGAs, with the objective of delivering performance rates 
that are not feasible on simulation-based techniques; 
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 Hybrid – mixture of two or more techniques trying to 
leverage and combine the best features of each of them. For 
example, fault injection using on-chip debug access available 
on the microprocessor to mimic hardware faults at software 
level.  
 
4.3.1. Fault injection aspects to consider for safety assessment 
 
Different goals require support to different requirements that 
associated with the target use-case. For example, hardware-based fault 
injection is not suitable for TB-Q since it is available far too late for when 
it is needed. Therefore, not all fault injection techniques are applicable in 
the functional safety context. For functional verification of SMs for 
example, different abstraction levels can be used. However, for the 
evaluation of the hardware architectural metrics, the latest design model 
before sign-off shall be used – e.g., GL netlist post-layout. The confidence 
of the results achieved with a fault injection campaign is proportional to 
the completeness of the stimulus used, the total of faults injected, and 
level of detail of the design description [28]. On the other hand, the ISO 
26262 does not require an exhaustive injection neither is entirely rigid 
about the used abstraction level. So, there is some flexibility, but it can be 
leveraged only if there is adequate justification. For example, fault 
injection based on RTL is acceptable, provided sufficient correlation with 
GL. However, this may be adequate for SM verification or initial DC 
assessment only. For the final evaluation of the SPFM and LFM, an 
auditor may not accept results based on RTL without an irrefutable 
argumentation. Such argumentation may not be feasible if there are 
solutions already available that provide more reliable results – e.g., that 
inject more faults on the detailed design model. Therefore, the best-effort 
concept is not just important for convincing a safety certification auditor. 
It can also result in a commercial advantage for a company that invests in 
a new solution, which might force the competition to accommodate the 
state-of-the-art in order to avoid future liability.  
In the functional safety context, the general requisites for fault 
injection targeting SM verification and DC assessment at semiconductor 
level, are: 
 Feature the injection of fault models associated with the 
permanent and transient failure modes including the 
definition of their parameters – e.g., fault injection time and 
fault duration; 
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 Support detailed design models, but also abstract descriptions 
for early assessment – e.g., GL and RTL as mentioned in the 
ISO 26262; 
 Definition of different observation points in order to 
distinguish faults detected by SMs from faults that propagate 
through the functional output without prevention; 
 Provide timing information with respect to fault observation 
thus allowing to check if the fault tolerant time interval is 
respected; 
 Multiple fault injection thus enabling the verification of SM 
that can handle more than one fault – e.g., Error Detection 
and Correction (EDC) mechanisms; 
 Usage of functional tests thus allowing an assessment closer 
to the real application. 
 
4.3.2. Optimizations and available tools 
 
Considering the general requisites, there are optimizations for 
reducing the overall time of fault injection campaigns, such as: 
 Fault collapsing and testability analysis for SAT faults and 
equivalent approaches for other fault models; 
 Reusability of the functional tests and the existing 
verification environment; 
 Ranking of the most suitable test for the fault injection 
campaign;  
 Optimal fault injection time based on the application; 
 Fault injection criteria to stop the injection run when it 
occurs;  
 Campaign threshold to conclude the campaign as soon as the 
goal is reached;  
 Distribution, parallelization, acceleration, and many others; 
Recently, the major EDA vendors have noticed that fault-injection 
solutions featuring these characteristics were missing in the market. 
Tailored extension of existing tools started to be released in the EDA 
business aiming to cope with the challenges of the functional safety 
assessment. Incisive Functional Safety Simulator (IFSS) is a perfect 
example [20] [21]. As an add-on to the vendor’s main HDL simulator, 
IFSS provides specific features reflecting the standard requisites. 
Competing with IFSS, there is Certitude, which was originally created for 
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TB-qualification based on fault mutation-technique, and now also support 
to the ISO 26262 fault models [68] [65] [8].  
IFSS is one of the tools used in this research. Since it is integrated 
to an event-driven simulator, IFSS can benefit from the latest verification 
methodologies and TB languages by reusing the existing functional 
verification environment. It can be employed throughout the design 
development due to the fault injection support at RTL and GL hence 
suitable for a functional safety flow. Even more important is the reduction 
of the fault campaign setup achieved by not requiring the generation of 
test vectors or being restricted to structural GL netlist. These two 
characteristics are common restrictions imposed by the most popular fault 
simulation algorithm in commercial DfT tools, which takes advantage of 
the GL netlist modularity to simulate only the parts affected by each fault, 
concurrently [69] [40] [70]. Additional to concurrent fault simulation, 
there are others DfT-oriented algorithms for performance improvement 
compared to standard event-driven simulation, but still with limitations to 
support behavioral models and transient faults. On the other hand, IFSS 
can leverage the most sophisticated distributed resource management 
(DRM) tools to run many faults simulation at the same time. However, 
despite the simulation-based technique utilized, an exhaustive safety 
assessment is practically impossible given the today’s design complexity 
and the total of faults to consider. Statistical methods like fault sampling 
permit to randomly select a feasible number of faults from the population 
and yet obtain relevant metrics with sufficient accuracy [71].  The ISO 
26262 suggests statistics for many other situations including fault 
sampling, which are out of scope for this study and will not be covered. 
 
4.4. FAULT SIMULATION ACCELERATION 
 
4.4.1. FPGA Techniques 
 
Emulation-based fault injection is typically proposed to overcome 
the long runtime of techniques based on simulation [13] [14]. In order to 
speed-up the fault injection run, FPGA-based techniques are often 
proposed as they can efficiently emulate the circuit. In the FPGA-based 
flow, the design must be synthesized to the specific target device, which 
is later configured with the resulting bitstream – i.e., the “synthesis 
image”. If the reproduction of the design copy containing a fault requires 
modification of the design description, then the synthesis process 
naturally becomes a bottleneck for the FPGA-based fault injection 
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emulation. Different approaches have been proposed over the years in 
order to avoid this bottleneck thus enabling the benefit of emulation-
acceleration [72] [73] [74] [75]. The general ideas of these approaches 
are: 
 Substitution of GL cells by highly controllable blocks that 
allows to enable or disable the error condition by fault 
injection manager running on the platform with minimal 
interaction of the computer host. This approach is suitable 
when intrusion is not a concern;  
 Dynamically partial reconfiguration featured in some FPGAs 
is explored aiming to reduce the intrusiveness of the previous 
approach. The fault injection controller is also implemented 
in the FPGA or the emulation platform thus minimizing the 
interaction with the host. However, these approaches rely on 
the controllability provided by the FPGA configuration 
resource, thus limiting the support to fault models; 
 By manipulating the bitstream, it is possible to reconfigure 
part of the circuit and replace it with its faulty version. In 
order to do that, the design running in the FPGA must be 
correctly stopped at the fault-injection instant and then 
resumed after the bitstream portion has been overwritten. The 
bitstream manipulation and reconfiguration must be executed 
in the platform hence close or even inside of the FPGA due 
to the communication bottleneck with the host. Additionally, 
a full mapping between the synthesis image and the circuit 
implemented in the FPGA must be disclosed by the 
manufacturer to permit proper bitstream manipulation.  
The application of FPGA-based approaches is mentioned in the 
ISO 26262. They are suitable for SM verification for example in order to 
maximize the performance of the fault campaign execution. However, the 
validation of the hardware architectural metrics shall be done using the 
most detailed model viable of the design. It might not be possible to show 
sufficient correlation between the synthesized model running in the 
FPGA and the latest GL netlist targeting another technology. Even if 
feasible, the collection of correlation evidence to convince the auditor is 
not a trivial task. Therefore, intrusive approaches like the replacement of 
GL cells to enable fault injection should be avoided. Less intrusive 
FPGA-based techniques can still be helpful as an additional methodology 
to corroborate the results achieved. 
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4.4.2. Abstract Model Approaches 
 
There are other acceleration approaches that explore the usage of 
higher level description models to enable efficient fault analyses at the 
system level [76] [77] [78]. Such methodology can be used to inject errors 
at earlier stages of the development process to quantitatively assess SMs 
selected to compose the design architecture. However, for more detailed 
analysis, the abstracts models must be further refined in order to keep 
sufficient level of details with respect to the actual design model. 
Consequently, the effort of maintaining a parallel development flow just 
for the high-level model with enough accuracy to the real implementation 
must be considered. Similar as in FPGA-based approaches, yet sufficient 
correlation between the models must be provided.   
 
4.4.3. Hardware-Assisted Platform 
 
4.4.3.1. Characteristics of the Available Platforms 
 
Hardware-assisted platforms are proved by the major EDA 
vendors as an acceleration solution for verification [10] [11] [12]. These 
specialized machines are typically installed in secured and acclimatized 
rooms given its valuable asset to the companies’ verification teams [79]. 
The most powerful model within the latest versions can emulate up to 9.2 
billion gates, which can correspond to 40 billion transistors depending on 
the design [80]. These platforms share some common features including 
multi-users and simulation acceleration among others. It is not surprising 
that these commercialized platforms also have in common the lack of 
fault injection support since they were built targeting functional 
verification speedup.  
This research explores Palladium XP (PXP) from Cadence Design 
Systems, Inc. in order to accelerate fault simulation. This hardware-
assisted verification platform can be employed for different verification 
purposes in order improve the turnaround time [81]. In the following, 
some of these purposes are listed: 
 Virtual prototyping – mixed-accuracy abstract models are 
emulated maybe together with RTL models eventually 
available in order to enable architecture decision making or 
closer software and hardware development and others; 
 Co-simulation – runs thousand times faster than simulation 
can be reached with the DUT mapped in the platform and the 
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TB residing in the host. Hence, it can still leverage the 
capabilities of advanced verification languages. 
 In-circuit emulation (ICE) – the full design is mapped into 
the verification platform with the possibility of real-world 
interaction devices through rate adapters for interfaces like 
Ethernet, USB, and others.    
A variation of the ICE mode exists, which supports the commonly 
called the synthesizable TBs (STB) that runs together with the DUT in 
the platform. The ICE mode with STB permits much higher simulation 
acceleration since there is no communication with the host, which 
naturally reduces the run performance.  
Run-time debugging features available in any commercial 
simulator are standard requirements for any acceleration solution. These 
features can be: waveform generation; run-time control/access to signal 
values; assertions; user customized logging; functional/code coverage 
collection; and so on. Such standard features are not exclusive to one 
hardware-acceleration platform they are supported by all of them. 
However, regarding their utilization in the fault injection context, there 
are specific characteristics that can be leveraged, which are not common 
to all solutions. 
 
4.4.3.2. The Application of the Hardware-Assisted Platform Used 
 
Since PXP is a processor-based platform, it contains a distinctive 
advantage towards the FPGA-based fault injection techniques discussed. 
The same design representation – later referred as snapshot – that is used 
by the simulation tool can also be mapped to run on PXP without 
requiring any synthesis step as in the FPGA flow. The snapshot resulted 
from the compilation of the HDL files is automatically mapped to the 
PXP. Hot-swap between the simulator and accelerator platform enables 
seamless execution of the snapshot on both domains. The processor-based 
architecture of PXP also delivers equivalent performance regardless 
design model being RTL and GL thus providing significant acceleration 
for GL simulation. The development history of the three most important 
hardware-assisted verification platforms indicates that PXP is the only 
solution not based on FPGA, which seems to allow these unique features 
[82] [83] [84]. 
Considering the functional safety context, all these characteristics 
made PXP an appealing candidate for fault injection. However, the actual 
feasibility of emulating faults using the hardware-assisted platform had to 
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be investigated. The potential benefit of using such kind of platforms for 
fault injection has recently been acknowledged as suggested future work 
[77] [85]. However, they either suggest an intrusive modification of the 
design model to enable fault emulation or recommend the definition of 
accurate fault models to be used with high-level abstractions models. 
Actually, it has been found only one research that proposes a solution 
based on the hardware-assisted platforms to accelerate fault simulation 
[86] – continuation of the work presented in [87]. The approach 
substitutes the flip-flop cells by equivalent saboteur cells that are used to 
enable SEU fault injection. Different from other intrusive techniques, the 
fault injection manager resides in the computers host thus resulting in 
more communication with between the host and the platform.  
There is no other similar approach, to the best of the author’s 
knowledge, which leverages from hardware-assisted platforms to 
accelerate the injection of the ISO 26262 models fault injection. 
 
4.5. CHAPTER REMARKS 
 
This chapter presented the main concepts of fault injection 
including various techniques available in the literature. Additionally, the 
hardware-assisted verification platforms were introduced and their 
characteristics discussed. There are unique features available in the PXP 
platform that are valuable for fault injection within the safety domain. 
Related works based on the hardware-assisted platforms are scarce and 
do not leverage the characteristics highlighter. In the next chapter the 
approach developed in this research to accelerate the fault simulation is 
presented. 
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5. LITERATURE REVIEW ON FAULT INJECTION 
ACCELERATION 
  
Fault injection is a widely accepted technique to assess design 
robustness [88]. Moreover, the injection of faults plays a key role in the 
manufacturing test domain [40]. Adding to that, fault injection is also 
employed for functional safety assessment and TB-Qualification. Across 
the use cases, there are many aspects that impact on fault injection 
definition. The abstraction level will define the fault models that can be 
applied and also the applicable optimization. For instance, the duration of 
the campaign, and the level of details in the design description also have 
influence in the number of faults to inject. Therefore, the phase of the 
product lifecycle where the fault injection is considered contributes to the 
decision regarding the applicable injection technique.  
 
5.1. SCOPE OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
With so many aspects associated with fault injection, innumerous 
researches have been conducted addressing several challenges that are 
intrinsic to each aspect. Therefore, it is important to draw the borderline 
in order to be able to cover one, or a couple of the possible topics properly. 
As already discussed, this Thesis’ goal is to propose a methodology to 
accelerate fault injection considering the functional safety challenges. To 
be more precise, the objective is to provide better performance than fault 
simulation when assessing the hardware architectural metrics before sign-
off. Therefore, the design abstraction level focused here is the gate-level 
netlist. RTL is also applicable, and it is planned to be covered in the 
future. The targeted fault model is Stuck-at (SAT), but SET and SEU 
faults are also discussed since they appear in the ISO 26262.  
The literature review considers fault injection acceleration 
solutions which match the provided scope definition. The functional 
safety requirements drive the related work discussion. Given the broader 
application of the proposed solution, it is possible that the presented 
contribution can be leveraged for other use cases different than functional 
safety. However, functional safety is focused by this Thesis.  
 
5.2. FPGA-BASED ACCELERATION VIA INSTRUMENTATION  
 
FPGA technology is vastly explored to accelerate fault injection 
campaigns. In 2001, Civera et al. [89] [90] presented an instrumentation 
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approach in order to provide the controllability and observability required 
to enable the fault injection emulation. In the next year, the more recent 
published results have shown a slight increase in the area overhead – i.e., 
between 8% and 42% – imposed by the presented solution [91]. Figure 
30 indicates the amount of instrumentation required per flip-flop to enable 
the injection of SEU faults. The reported acceleration was up to 60 times 
faster fault injection when compared to fault simulation. 
 
 
 
Figure 30 – Instrumented flip-flop. (Source [91]). 
Lopez-Ongil et al. [92] in 2007 proposed an approach also based 
on instrumentation to enable the control of the design atomic parts in 
order to inject the faults. However, the presented “time-multiplexed” 
technique seems to be the main difference of this solution, which allows 
having the fault-free and the faulty version of the design running in 
alternate clock cycles. Figure 31 shows the flip-flop instrumentation 
required to implement “time-multiplexed” solution. Another two 
instrumentation techniques are presented with less area overhead, but 
consuming more memory resources of the FPGA. The claimed 
performance is about 106 SEU fault injections per second. However, such 
performance is achieved by quadruplicating the FPGA area consumed by 
the user design.  
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Figure 31 – Flip-flop instrumentation enabling the “time-multiplexed” technique. 
(Source [92]). 
Entrena et al. [72] in 2010 published the work presented by Lopez-
Ongil in 2007. The diagram block with the proposed approach is shown 
in Figure 32  
 
 
 
Figure 32 – Emulation platform diagram. (Source [72]). 
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In this version, SET faults are supported due to the modeling of 
delays inside of the cells at gate-level netlist. A second design module is 
generated with only the FF instrumented. The idea is to inject SET faults 
using in delay-enabled module implemented using shift registers 
resources available in the used FPGA. Whenever, a sequential element 
captures the fault, then the design state – i.e., flip-flop logic values at a 
given moment – is copied to the module version with the instrumented 
flip-flops only. This second module can run faster since it has not 
implemented the delay. Both modules run on the FPGA, and the 
“emulation manager” – shown in Figure 32 – selects the module to 
execute. To enable SET fault injection acceleration, the proposed solution 
requires a massive instrumentation. Additionally, the fault injection 
campaign is executed over two generated models, which are derived from 
the original design description. 
 
5.3. FPGA-BASED ACCELERATION VIA RECONFIGURATION 
 
Kenterlis et al. [93] in 2006 presents a platform, which automates 
the fault injection of SEU faults by using the JBits API to tweak the 
bitstream image used to configure the FPGA. With the API and full 
control of the bitstream generation, only bits actually disturbing 
configurable logic blocks could be selected to inject the faults, thus 
reducing the fault space. Even if the faults were injected on the occupied 
FPGA resources, the proposed methodology still was more verifying the 
device itself than the fault tolerant design configured in the FPGA. Hence, 
the approach was overdoing the vendor’s work, which already provided 
reliability experiments information at that time [94]. Additionally, 
significant interaction with the host is required, and a faster 
communication link had to be used in order to reduce the bottleneck. Up 
to two order of magnitude have been observed between simulation and 
the proposed solution. Kuuhn et al. [95] in 2013 presented a similar 
approach, but instead of using the JBits API, a tool was developed to 
make the link. The developed tool provides the correlation between the 
fault selected at circuit description – e.g., VHDL, Verilog – level, and the 
generated bitstream for the injection of the fault. However, the research 
focus was fault tolerance hence no fault injection performance figures 
were discussed. 
Aguirre et al. [96] [97] presented a non-intrusive FPGA solution, 
where the fault are injected by the manipulating the configuration 
memory of the device. Instead of corrupting the bitstream, FT-
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UNSHADES leverages the dynamic partial reconfiguration available in 
some FPGAs to inject the faults. Figure 33 shows the implemented 
approach. The fault-free and faulty version share the same inputs, and 
their outputs compared in order to check if the injected fault has 
propagated out of the design.  
 
 
Figure 33 – FT-UNSHADES Emulation approach presented in  [97]. 
Mogollon et al. [74] in 2011 presented the second version of the 
FT-UNSHADES solution. The new release promises to have eliminated 
the communication bottleneck by processing all data management in the 
developed platform. Experiments showing performance ration about 
100k faults per second are claimed. However, the presented results 
achieve up to 1980 fault injection runs per second.  
 
5.4. SIMULATION-BASED ACCELERATION VIA INSTRUMENTA-
TION 
 
Rohani and Kerkhoff [98] in 2011 presented the experiment results 
achieved with the proposed simulation-based approach. First, the design 
is modified in order to add the saboteurs shown in Figure 34. These 
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saboteurs allow to inject two SET and the SEU transient faults, and it also 
permits to instrument a delay fault model. Each saboteur has an enable 
signal which is controlled through the simulator tool commands. A pre-
analysis is performed utilizing a mathematical tool to configure the fault 
campaign by defining the fault target, injection time, and injection 
duration. The detection is checked as post-process step by comparing the 
logged data generate during the fault-free run after each fault simulation. 
The authors claim between 27% and 67% CPU time reduction against 
other two considered.   
 
 
 
Figure 34 – (a) SET 01. (b) SET 10. (c) Delay fault. (d) SEU. (Adapted from 
[98]) 
5.5. ACCELERATION VIA FAULT CAMPAIGN OPTIMIZATION  
 
Ebrahimi et al. [99] in 2015 presents a fault injection solution 
applicable to the fault campaign pre-analysis in order to avoid wasting 
time by ineffective fault injection. The proposed solution does not 
consider an injection technique per se. Instead, it highlights the potential 
benefit achieved with sampling by using the proposed analytical analysis 
thus providing campaign speedup factor up to thirteen. Such contribution 
can be leveraged by the workload profiling technique mentioned in the 
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functional safety assessment methodology presented in [39]. In general, 
the proposed approach applies to any fault injection technique.   
 
5.6. ACCELERATION VIA COMPLEXITY ABSTRACTION 
 
Bombieri et al. [100] in 2011 utilize Transaction-Level Modeling 
vastly used for functional verification at the system level in order to 
optimize the fault simulation. The proposed approach claims automatic 
extraction of the TLM models from the RTL description. Additionally, an 
ATPG implemented with TLM models is used to generate the stimulus 
for the DUT automatically. Even stating initially that by using TLM, the 
performance gain can get up to a factor of thousand when compared to 
standard RTL simulation, the results show a speedup between 6.3 and 
68.8 times faster runs. Moreover, an interesting contribution corresponds 
to the possibility of reusing the test vectors generated by TLM-ATPG 
back into the RTL simulation.  
 
5.7. ACCELERATION VIA HARDWARE-ASSISTED VERIFICA-
TION PLATFORMS 
 
Daveau et al. [87] in 2009 proposed a fault injection acceleration 
methodology using the hardware-assisted verification platforms. In the 
following year, Bailan et al. [86] seemed to have moved forward with the 
research, and published more experimental results. Similar to other 
approaches, the acceleration is based on the instrumentation of the flip-
flops to enable the controllability required by SEU fault injection. About 
20% of area overhead in addition to the fault injection controller that also 
runs on the platform. Given the massive parallelism implemented, a 
significant fault injection runtime reduction is achieved. The selected 
fault target is a Leon2 IP core which can be replicated 19 times into the 
same hardware-assisted platform domain. Using the 16 domains, 304 
faults could be injected at the same time. Figure 35 shows that to achieve 
such parallelism, one controller per domain is required in addition to the 
master controller running in the host.   
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this research is the only fault 
injection acceleration technique, which is similar to the MADC solution 
that is proposed in this Thesis. Therefore, a discussion comparing the 
results achieved is carried out in the experiments chapter. 
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Figure 35 – Fault injection platform architecture highlighting the implemented 
parallelism in [86] [87]. 
5.8. COMMENTS ON THE REVIEWED RELATED WORK 
 
The presented MADC solution is different from any work found in 
the literature review, as it does not require changing the design description 
neither to provide the required controllability/observability nor to 
synthesize for a different technology than the targeted one. Table 15 lists 
some comments on the related work considering their application to 
functional safety. 
 
Table 15 – Related work comments.  
Related work Comments 
Civera et al.  
[89] [90] 
Instrumentation required with significant area overhead; 
performance gain not as high as more modern solutions.  
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Lopez-Ongil  
et al. [92] 
 
Entrena  
et al. [72]  
Massive instrumentation needed in order to provide 
sufficient controllability and testability in order to enable 
fault injection; given the amount of instrumentation, it 
may not be possible to justify a safety assessment done 
using such different model. A SET fault injection 
solution is later presented. However, a massive 
instrumentation is required, and the campaign is 
executed over two modules extracted from the original 
design description. Three thousand SET faults per 
second was the performance achieved in the latest 
version commented.   
 
Kenterlis  
et al. [93] 
 
FPGA-based approach where the faults are emulated by 
external  manipulating the device configuration to mimic 
the fault; it is questionable whether there is any value 
injecting faults in the device instead of the user logic 
configured in the device; Even if not requiring 
modification of the design description, the safety 
assessment is done in the synthesized model targeting a 
device different from the actually aimed application; 
Kuuhn  
et al. [95] 
Aguirre et al. 
[96] [97] 
 
 Mogollon et 
al. [74] 
FT-UNSHADES work is already in the second version 
given its successful application in the aerospace and 
academic domains. However, the external manipulation 
of the FPGA’s configuration memory seems to limit 
fault injection ration. Approaches like in [75] presented 
by the author, which leverage the internal access to the 
FPGA’s configuration memory could be used to improve 
the performance. FT-UNSHADES supports the injection 
of SEU and SET faults.  
Rohani and  
Kerkhoff [98] 
Simulation-based approach combined with 
instrumentation; the pre-analysis for the campaign 
configuration is something applicable to any fault 
injection solution, which can be considered; 
Ebrahimi  
et al. [99] 
In general, it is applicable to any fault injection 
technique; Applicable to the safety domain;  
Bombieri  
et al. [100] 
The safety assessment would be performed based on a 
high-level generated model, and not in the actual design 
description.   
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Daveau  
et al. [87] 
Bailan  
et al. [86] 
Massive parallelism, which can be leveraged by MADC; 
Outstanding fault injection runtime achieved; Based on 
instrumentation, which is not desired from the safety 
point of view; 
 
5.9. CHAPTER REMARKS 
 
In Chapter 3, the related work containing relevant description 
about the fault injection application to the functional safety domain is 
presented. In Chapter 0, some of the state-of-the-art fault injection 
approaches are cited. However, the related work discussion up to Chapter 
5 was not sufficient, given the generic aspect of the proposed acceleration 
solution. Therefore, in this chapter, a more broad literature review is 
performed in order to allow putting the Thesis’ contribution in perspective 
to the state-of-the-art. Next chapters present the proposed methodology 
details and the obtained results.  
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6. PROPOSED FAULT INJECTION ACCELERATION 
STRATEGY 
 
As already mentioned, the proposed approach is based on the PXP 
hardware-assisted platform, which is originally intended for general 
functional verification speedup. The methodology implemented leverages 
this platform to accelerated fault injection campaign execution. In order 
to inject faults, the approach uses the common simulation debugging 
features that are supported by PXP and other hardware-assisted solutions 
thus not being restricted to one vendor. However, PXP has unique 
characteristics and features that are leveraged here in order to achieve 
better turnaround time.  
Typical emulation-based techniques and other intrusive 
approaches can demand a significant effort to convince the auditor by 
showing the correlation between the latest design model and the one used 
for the safety assessment. Therefore, such techniques may not be 
applicable for the hardware architecture metrics evaluation using the pre-
silicon design model. The proposed approach avoid any kind of design 
modification since it can run the simulation and the emulation sharing the 
same snapshot, i.e., the HDL design compilation image.  
MADC is the shortening for Methodology to Accelerated the 
Diagnostic Coverage assessment. MADC is split into three main parts in 
order to explain the proposed methodology. These three parts are: 
 Enablement: the faults that can be accelerated are identified. 
Collapsing is used to extend fault-set of identified faults. 
Testability is used to avoid injection of untestable fault on 
simulation or emulation; 
 Flow: includes the required data input, the used tools, the 
storage and manipulation before and during the fault 
injection, the tools used, and the generated results; 
 Execution: control of the runs and fault detection were 
implemented to enable fault injection using the hardware-
assisted platform; 
 
6.1. MADC ENABLEMENT 
 
Force, deposit, and release are common features found in 
commercial RTL simulation tools. They permit to control internal signal 
values directly from the simulator console. The force command makes a 
design signal remain stuck at the value predefined, while the release can 
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undo this. Similar to the force behavior, the deposit command also sets an 
internal design signal to a certain value. However, the value set by the 
deposit is overridden by the normal operation of the circuit whenever the 
signal is driven again. The same set of commands are possible on PXP, 
and they can be used to insert a fault condition in the design without 
modifying the description. The force command has similar characteristics 
as the SAT faults. On the other hand, the deposit feature is analogous to 
the SEU fault behavior. In the proposed methodology, the force command 
is used in order to replicate the fault injection effect of a SAT fault without 
modifying the design model.  
As already seen, the effect of a SAT fault shall not propagate 
backward. However, the force command is applicable to the whole line 
thus generating an incompatible behavior towards the SAT fault model. 
Figure 36 highlights the backward propagation problem when using the 
force command to inject a SAT fault in the g3.A pin. On the other hand, 
there are many faults in the design, which the back propagation has no 
impact on any other part of the design – e.g., cell outputs. Therefore, a 
structural analysis has been developed in order to identify those nodes 
where the SAT faults can be injected regardless if the fault effect 
backward propagates or not. 
 
 
 
Figure 36 – Backward propagation problem associated with the force command.  
Structural information extraction from the GL netlist is required to 
identify the faults that can be executed in the hardware-assisted platform. 
The extraction was implemented using two different synthesis tools in 
order to compare and validate the information collected [101] [102]. 
Redundant tool flows when considering the tools’ confidence level 
required in the ISO 26262 [103]. Additionally, an ATPG tool was utilized 
to generate the fault list with SAT industry compatible fault model 
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together with the fault equivalent groups and testability information 
[104]. 
Figure 37 shows the MUX once more, but this time, the circuit is 
not directly connected to the PIs and POs. Hence only the SAT faults in 
the gates are considered. Figure 37 is used to explain which faults can 
actually be selected for injection utilizing the force command, and how 
the number of faults suitable for acceleration can be optimized leveraging 
the collapsing and the testability information.    
 
 
Figure 37 – SAT fault selection.  
Naturally, faults located on cell outputs do not have the backward 
propagation issue since the effect of the force command cannot overpass 
the line driver. The remaining faults may be collapsible with the output 
faults thus allowing to maximize the ratio of faults verified by 
acceleration and those that can only be simulated. However, it is 
important to select the appropriate set of prime faults – equivalent group 
representatives – in order to guarantee the correctness of the fault 
injection executed in the emulator. Table 16 contains the equivalent 
groups (EGs) for the example of Figure 37, and the IDs of the prime faults 
are highlighted in bold – i.e., faults 6, 8, 12, 14, 19, 21, and 22.  
The “acceleratable” (ACC) set of faults starts with those eight 
located on cell outputs (OUT). The ratio of ACC faults is then optimized 
by using logical collapsing (COL). Faults on input cells may not appear 
in any equivalent group but still fit for verified through acceleration. Such 
case can occur when the fault resides in an input cell that is connected to 
a 1-1 LINE (1-1L), and there is no fault instrumented in the driver side; 
otherwise, the two faults would have been collapsed. Fault 14 fits this 
situation hence it is the only fault on the 1-1L column that is added to 
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ACC list in Table 16. A similar case happens with faults on unconnected 
pins of registers or other cells, which also are not collapsible but still can 
be accelerated.  
 
Table 16 – Fault list analysis for the MUX example. 
Fault List Equivalent Groups Ratio Optimization 
Id
 
N
o
d
e 
T
y
p
e 
I/
O
 
E
G
1
 
E
G
2
 
E
G
3
 
E
G
4
 
E
G
s 
O
U
T
 
C
O
L
 
1
-1
L
 
A
C
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S
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1 g1.A sa0 I     8 8     8 
2 g1.A sa1 I 21    21     21 
3 g1.Y sa0 O 21    21     21 
4 g1.Y sa1 O     8 8     8 
5 g2.A sa0 I 21    21     21 
6 g2.A sa1 I      6      
7 g2.B sa0 I 21    21     21 
8 g2.B sa1 I     8 8     8 
9 g2.Y sa0 O    17  17     17 
10 g2.Y sa1 O 21    21     21 
11 g3.A sa0 I 21    21     21 
12 g3.A sa1 I      12      
13 g3.B sa0 I 21    21     21 
14 g3.B sa1 I      14     14 
15 g3.Y sa0 O   19   19     19 
16 g3.Y sa1 O 21    21     21 
17 g4.A sa0 I    17  17     17 
18 g4.A sa1 I 21    21     21 
19 g4.B sa0 I   19   19     19 
20 g4.B sa1 I 21    21     21 
21 g4.Y sa0 O 21    21      21 
22 g4.Y sa1 O         22      22 
22 faults  11 2 2 3 8 8  11 1 20  6 
Faults: () selected by the optimization; () new to the acceleration set 
105 
From the 22 SAT faults in the MUX example, 20 can be 
accelerated (ACC) as shown in Table 16. However, the faults that can 
actually be injected must be located on a cell output, 1-1 line, or on a not 
driven pin. Therefore, the representative faults of the equivalent groups 
within the set of ACC faults need to be selected properly in order to avoid 
the backward propagation issue. The faults that are selected (SEL) to be 
injected via the hardware-assisted platform are marked in bold – i.e., 8, 
14, 17, 19, 21 and 22. For that reason, the fault representatives of the EGs 
that are selected for acceleration can be different from the original prime 
faults.  
To summarize the importance of the MADC fault selection, then 
the backward propagation related to the SAT fault injection via force 
command must be clear. Figure 38 shows a hypothetical circuit to explain 
the effect of the force command on the line in order to define when this 
effect can be used to mimic a SAT fault model. Considering this fault 
model, then the forward propagation is the expected behavior hence not 
represented in the circuit illustration. Although the backward propagation 
is not a valid SAT fault behavior, yet there are many circuit locations 
where it has no actual side effect thus allowing to employ the force 
feature.  
 
 
 
Figure 38 – Highlight the importance of the MADC fault selection. 
The force command is used to inject one SAT fault in the input of 
the cell g3 in Figure 38. Given the force semantics [105], then everything 
between the drivers and the sources of the line gets affected. Since the 
fault is injected close to the source (g3 input pin) of the line, then the force 
behavior in the line can be seen as the backward propagation of the fault 
effect. For the fault injected in the g3.A, the force effect goes backward 
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until it gets to the driver (g1.Y output) thus not disturbing any other part 
of the circuit. Therefore, this fault is a suitable candidate for acceleration. 
Notice that backward propagation concern is not applicable to fault 
located at the drivers.   
As already mentioned, there are some situations where the fault 
effect does not only propagates towards the driver, but it also affects other 
cells. For example, the force applied to the g4 input pin in Figure 38 
generates a side effect by disturbing the g3 cell as well. Therefore, 
whenever a line connects one driver to multiple sources, then the force 
command is not suitable for the injection of the SAT faults residing on 
cell inputs. For those cases, MADC checks if there is any equivalent fault 
located in a driver, which then can be selected for acceleration. Table 17 
lists the faults located between the sources and the drivers illustrated in 
Figure 38 and comments whether they can be selected for acceleration or 
not.  
 
Table 17 – Faults suitable for acceleration considering the hypothetical circuit 
example.  
Cell Pin Tie Is the fault suitable for fault acceleration? 
g1 output (Y) driver Yes. Output faults are always suitable 
g2 output (Y) driver Yes. Output faults are always suitable 
g3 input (A) source Yes. Same effect as injecting an output fault 
g3 input (B) source a No, since it would disturb g4 as well 
g4 input (A) source  a No, since it would disturb g3 as well 
g4  input (B) source  Yes, assuming it is unconnected.  
a although this fault itself can not be accelerated, still it may be 
collapsible with another fault located in the cell output. 
 
6.1.1. Enablement Algorithm 
 
The fault selection described using the Table 16 can be seen as a 
three steps procedure. The first-step corresponds to the selection of the 
faults located in the output. The second-step and third-step are related to 
the ratio optimization of faults that can be accelerated. These procedure 
steps are illustrated by the pseudo-algorithm shown in Figure 39. MADC 
relies on the structural circuit analysis developed to explore the SAT fault 
injection in the hardware-assisted platform by discovering the faults that 
do not require isolation – i.e.; its effect does not backward propagate. The 
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“Algorithm 1” in Figure 39 represents this structural analysis, where the 
function c.faults(out,SAT) prints the SAT (SA0 and SA1) faults on the 
output of cell c, while c.faults(in,SA0) prints the SA0 faults on inputs of 
c. The p.faults(SA1) prints the SA1 fault of the corresponding cell pin p. 
The p.connections() returns the number or cell pins interconnected by the 
wire that is also connected to pin p. 
 
 
 
Figure 39 – Pseudo-algorithm for printing the suitable faults to execute in the 
hardware-assisted platform. 
As already mentioned, the pseudo-algorithm shown in Figure 39 
starts with the execution of the first-step to print all SAT faults located at 
cell outputs, which are suitable for acceleration by default. As a second-
step, the procedure prints the faults that are collapsible to the output faults 
thus being indirectly enabled for acceleration. After considering the 
equivalent groups to increase the ratio of classified faults via acceleration, 
then another optimization step is executed.  
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The third-step searches for faults in the same condition as the ones 
located at the g3.A and g4.B pins of the example in Figure 38. Therefore, 
if the function p.connections() returns a value greater than two, then it 
means that a g3.B or g4.A kind of fault has been found. In this case, the 
fault is not selected for acceleration, and the next fault is analyzed. When 
the p.connections() is equal to one, then the fault is located at an 
unconnected input pin – similar to the g4.B example. To not print the 
same fault twice, MADC algorithm checks if the fault has not been 
collapsed or marked as untestable already. Faults located on an input pin 
connected to a 1-1 line can also be selected – the same situation as for the 
g3.A fault in Figure 38. The faults not collapsed before are printed by the 
MADC algorithm.  
The DiscoverFaultsToAccel procedure shown in Figure 39 prints 
all faults to be classified using the hardware-assisted platform. However, 
only the prime faults need to be executed. In order to avoid choosing a 
fault with side effects, MADC selects from the equivalent group, always 
one fault that is located on a cell output pin. The faults printed during the 
third-step are the only faults residing in cell input pin that are executed 
on the verification platform. 
All faults not printed by the MADC algorithm can only be 
simulated, or some kind of design instrumentation is required in order to 
isolate the fault node from the rest of the circuit thus avoiding the 
backward propagation problem. Since the goal is to use the same design 
representation for the fault injection, then instrumentation is not 
considered this Thesis. 
It is important to notice that the information printed by the 
structural analysis procedure illustrated in Figure 39 must permit the 
mapping between the selected faults and the original fault list generated 
by the ATPG tool. This information includes the original fault IDs, the 
EGs indication, the direction (I/O), the fault type, and the fault node. 
Table 18 demonstrates the fault list that should be generated by the 
pseudo-algorithm presented in Figure 39 with the minimum content 
necessary to allow identifying the faults that can have its classified via 
fault injection acceleration and also permitting back annotate the results 
into the original fault list. The shaded rows in Table 18 indicate the faults 
that actually need to be injected to be able classify all 20 faults in the list. 
Each equivalence group (EG) has one bolded fault IDs to indicate the 
selection. Among those six fault IDs selected, five are located in the first 
cell output of the EG. Notice that fault 01 would backward propagate thus 
affecting gate g2 as well. Therefore, it is important to select fault in the 
outputs whenever possible. Only fault 14 resides in a cell input since it is 
109 
not collapsed with an output port. Fault 14 is selected by the 1-1 LINE 
rule.  
 
Table 18 – Fault list generated by the “Algorithm 1”. 
ID Type I/O EGs Node  3 sa0 O 21 g1.Y 
1 sa0 I 8 g1.A  5 sa0 I 21 g2.A 
4 sa1 O 8 g1.Y  7 sa0 I 21 g2.B 
8 sa1 I 8 g2.B  10 sa1 O 21 g2.Y 
14 sa1 I 14 g3.B  11 sa0 I 21 g3.A 
9 sa0 O 17 g2.Y  13 sa0 I 21 g3.B 
17 sa0 I 17 g4.A  16 sa1 O 21 g3.Y 
15 sa0 O 19 g3.Y  18 sa1 I 21 g4.A 
19 sa0 I 19 g4.B  20 sa1 I 21 g4.B 
2 sa1 I 21 g1.A  21 sa0 O 21 g4.Y 
      22 sa1 O 22 g4.Y 
 
The handling of the PIs, POs, and untestable faults are not shown 
in Figure 39 since they are not part of the MUX example illustrated in 
Figure 37. However, they must be considered for the correct calculation 
of the metrics hence they are covered by the MADC structural analysis. 
 
6.1.2. The Ratio of Faults Suitable for Acceleration. 
 
The number of faults that can be accelerated within a GL netlist is 
given by FACCEL in (12). FACCEL consists of three addends: 𝟐 ∗ |𝑪| and the 
summation of the functions 𝒇(𝒄) in (13) and 𝒈(𝒄, 𝒑) in (14), which are 
associated with the steps in the Algorithm 1 in Figure 39.  
 
𝑭𝑨𝑪𝑪𝑬𝑳 = 𝟐 ∗ |𝑪| + ∑ 𝒇(𝒄)
𝒄 ∈ 𝑪
+ ∑ ∑ 𝒈(𝒄, 𝒑)
𝒑 ∈ 𝑷𝒄 ∈ 𝑪
 (12) 
𝑪 = {𝒄 | 𝒄 is a cell instance}, 𝑷 = {𝒑 | 𝒑 is an input pin of a given cell 𝒄} 
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𝒇 = {
𝟎,   𝒄 ∈ {𝑭𝑭, 𝑿𝑶𝑹, 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒙}
𝟐,                     𝒄 ∈ {𝑰𝑵𝑽, 𝑩𝑼𝑭}
|𝑷|,          𝒄 ∈ {𝑵/𝑶𝑹, 𝑵/𝑨𝑵𝑫}
 (13) 
 
𝒈 = {
𝟎,   (𝒑. 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔() > 𝟐) ⋁ (𝒄 ∈ {𝑰𝑵𝑽, 𝑩𝑼𝑭})
𝟏,                                                  𝒄 ∈ {𝑵/𝑶𝑹, 𝑵/𝑨𝑵𝑫}
𝟐,                                         𝒄 ∈ {𝑭𝑭, 𝑿𝑶𝑹, 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒙}
 (14) 
 
The 𝟐 ∗ |𝑪| results in two times the number of cells belonging to 𝑪 
– e.g., all cells in the netlist – thus corresponding to the amount of SA0 
and SA1 faults located at the cell outputs. The function 𝒇(𝒄) is equal to 
the number of collapsible input faults for each cell 𝒄 according to the 
logical collapsible rules presented in Figure 26 except the “1-1 LINE” 
rule. For instance, 𝒇(𝒄) equals to the number of inputs |𝑷| of 𝒄 when it is 
an AND, OR, NAND, or a NOR gate. On the other hand, the function 
𝒈(𝒄, 𝒑) is equal to the number of faults on the input pins 𝒑 of a cell 𝒄 that 
are collapsible according to the “1-1 LINE” rule – i.e., the line where the 
fault resides has no more than two connection ends. Therefore, the 
summations ∑𝒇(𝒄) and ∑𝒈(𝒄, 𝒑) provide the total number of faults that 
can also be accelerated due to the collapsing optimization. Table 19 shows 
the results of applying (12) for the MUX example illustrated in Figure 37.  
 
Table 19 – Results of each step of the MADC analysis  
Faults that 
can be: 
Ratio of accelerated faults per step 
No𝑭𝑨𝑪𝑪𝑬𝑳 𝟐 ∗ |𝑪| ∑𝒇(𝒄) ∑𝒈(𝒄, 𝒑) 
Accelerated 0 8 16 20 
Only simulated 22 14 6 2 
Accel.  Ratio 0.00% 36.36% 72.72% 90.91% 
 
The accumulated result of each term in (12) is shown by the 
“Accelerated” row in Table 19.  After each term is calculated, the number 
of faults that can be accelerated increases hence reducing the number of 
faults that can only be simulated. For the MUX example shown in Figure 
37, up to 90.91% of all faults can be accelerated by just selecting the 
appropriate set of prime faults to be used for the injection campaign. In 
other words, less than 10% of the faults require design model adaption to 
provide the isolation essential for the SAT model. To keep MADC as a 
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zero intrusion solution, these two faults are simulated using IFSS – or any 
fault simulator. Meanwhile, the hardware-assisted platform can accelerate 
90.91% of the faults hence enabling the parallel execution of fault 
injection on both engines thus reducing the overall execution time of the 
fault campaign.  
 
6.2. MADC FLOW 
 
 
 
Figure 40 – MADC flow diagram.  
The proposed MADC flow diagram is presented in Figure 40. In 
addition to the design model (Design Source), the flow requires the 
definition for the faults to be injected (Fault target) and also the definition 
for the strobes (Strobes) that are the detection points. The fault definition 
can be the instance path of a subpart of the design model. Currently, 
MADC consider only SAT faults, but it can be extended to support other 
fault models. A time different than zero or a specific condition – e.g., 
100ns after reset sequence – to trigger the injection can be set in order to 
permit the evaluation of faults occurring during normal operation 
conditions – i.e., random faults. The strobe information provided to 
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MADC contains a list of detection points and their location meaning 
towards the fault classification defined by the ISO 26262.  
 
6.2.1. Mapping the campaign results to the standard classification 
 
The inputs for the MADC flow follow similar semantics as for the 
IFSS’s inputs, and they are translated by MADC to the PXP language and 
interface in order to provide transparent integration between the two 
engines. IFSS permits the definition of two strobe groups thus allowing a 
more advanced fault classification than typically supported by standard 
DFT fault simulators, such as detected, undetected or potentially detected. 
The former classification causes an unknown value – i.e., “X value” or 
“don’t care” – at an observation point hence not giving a definitive 
answer about its detection. It must be remembered that the ISO 26262 
compliance demands the assessment of faults that negatively impact the 
SPFM and LFM, which are the SPFs or RFs and the LFs, respectively. 
Whenever the required metrics are not achieved, SMs can be added to 
detect these faults and turn their classification into DFs – or MPFD. Using 
the IFSS terminology, the detection points can be grouped as functional 
or checker strobes to support ISO 26262 fault classification. For instance, 
as many faults as possible should be prevented from getting to a 
functional strobe. In other words, the functional strobes correspond to 
where the failure mode is considered activated. On the other hand, the 
checker strobes are located in the observation points that indicate when a 
fault was diagnosed.  
The fault classification done by IFSS depends on which strobe 
group was triggered by the fault propagation. A fault that only propagates 
to a functional observation point is classified as dangerous undetected 
(DU) according to the IFSS syntax. The faults detected by SMs hence 
triggering the checker strobes can either be classified as safe detected 
(SD) or dangerous detected (DD) whether they also propagate or not 
through a functional strobe. Safe undetected (SU) is the classification of 
faults that either remain latent or are masked by the circuit and hence no 
observation point within the strobes groups is triggered. The mapping 
between IFSS and ISO 26262 fault classifications is shown in Table 20. 
A fault that propagates through functional output can be classified 
as DF if an SM later detects the fault thus triggering a checker strobe 
observing the error detection time specified. IFSS permits to specify this 
time window between triggering of functional strobe until the detection 
at checker strobe. Additionally, the simulation can be configured to stop 
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whenever a checker strobe is activated or the error detection time window 
ends. The stopping feature can reduce the overall execution time of a fault 
campaign by only running the test completely when strictly necessary – 
e.g., safe-undetected (SU) faults are not detected at any observation point 
hence the whole test is executed. However, the optimization achieved 
with this feature varies according to the number of faults injected that can 
quickly propagate to an observation point thus stopping the simulation.  
 
Table 20 – IFSS and ISO 26262 fault classification mapping.  
Fault that 
propagates 
Strobe Groups Fault Classification 
Functional Checker IFSS  ISO 26262 
only to: X  DU    SPF/RF 
to both: X X DD DF a 
only to:  X SD        DF 
to none.   SU        LF 
a assuming the error detection time stipulated is observed. 
 
6.2.2. The MADC interface definition 
 
Additional to the fault list format, the MADC supports the IFSS 
fault classification syntax thus allowing the translation to the ISO 26262 
terminology. This includes the untestable (UT) faults that are classified 
as SFs since they cannot violate an SG. The definition of functional and 
checker strobes are also supported by the MADC flow as well as the set 
of time window between the two groups in order to proper classify the 
faults. The MADC support here means that the proposed methodology 
enables equivalent features already provided in the simulator, on the 
hardware-assisted platform. 
The MADC controls the ATPG tool in order to generate the SAT 
fault list with the collapsing and testability results. The synthesis tools are 
used to collect the number of connections and the direction for each pin 
where the faults are located. All this information is committed to a 
PostgreSQL (PG) database that is used to store, sort, and filter the faults 
in order to generate the lists with those suitable for acceleration according 
to the algorithm shown in Figure 39. Another list is generated for the 
faults that can only be simulated – in this case, the IFSS. Both lists contain 
only the primes hence the minimum set of faults to be injected by each 
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engine. After injecting the selected faults, MADC collects the reports 
generated by IFSS and the results achieved with PXP in order to annotate 
the classification back to all faults stored in the PG database. Finally, the 
resulting fault annotation can be translated into the ISO 26262 
classification using the mapping from Table 20. 
 
6.2.3. Link to the FMEDA 
 
A technical FMEDA contains the relevant information needed for 
the definition of the fault campaign inputs. The targeting area where to 
inject the faults can be specified based on the part/subpart name found in 
the spreadsheet first columns like in the example shown in Table 11. The 
failure mode defines the fault model. Functional strobes can be mapped 
to the part/subpart outputs. The SM references can be used to find the 
observation points to be selected as checker strobes.  
The MADC fault classification results provide the information 
required to calculate the percentages that must be annotated back to the 
FMEDA in order to allow the evaluation of the SPFM and LFM. The 
failure rate fraction associated with the safe faults is entered in the 
FMEDA as the percentage calculated in (15) where the number of 
untestable faults (#𝑈𝑇) is divided by the size of the fault set. The amount 
of dangerous undetected faults (#𝐷𝑈) is used in (16) to find the 
percentage of the RFs failure rate that is covered by an SM. The same 
happens with the total of safe undetected faults (#𝑆𝑈) in (17) that is equal 
to the DCLF, which also corresponds to the LF failure rate percentage.  
 
𝐹𝑆𝐹(%) =  
#𝑈𝑇
(#𝑈𝑇 + #𝐷𝑈 + #𝑆𝑈 + #𝐷𝐷 + #𝑆𝐷)
× 100 (15) 
 
𝐷𝐶𝑅𝐹(%) =  
#𝐷𝑈
(#𝐷𝑈 + #𝑆𝑈 + #𝐷𝐷 + #𝑆𝐷)
× 100 (16) 
 
𝐷𝐶𝐿𝐹(%) =  
#𝑆𝑈
(#𝑆𝑈 + #𝐷𝐷 + #𝑆𝐷)
× 100 (17) 
 
There are innumerous spreadsheet formats as well as requirement 
management tools that provide support to FMEDAs. For that reason, one-
size-fits-all solution for interfacing all kind of FMEDA tools is 
unrealistic. However, the precise definition of the MADC input and 
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output allows the development of an interface to any solution available in 
order to automate the link to the FMEDA. 
 
6.3. MADC FAULT INJECTION EXECUTION 
 
As mentioned before, the fault injection is performed by two 
different engines. Therefore, the MADC is split into two sub-flows for 
the fault campaign execution. In the left side of the flow, there are the 
steps perform the fault injection using the hardware-assisted platform 
while on the right side of Figure 40, the three IFSS’s steps are shown. 
Regardless the engine, three common steps are executed, which are: 
 Elaboration: corresponds to the design model compilation 
into a snapshot that is loaded by the tool when starting the 
simulation.  
 Good Run: fault-free execution of the snapshot to collect the 
reference values on the functional and checker strobes 
defined;  
 Fault Run: fault injection execution until the test completes 
or a checker strobe is triggered thus deviating from the 
reference value. 
As already mentioned, the snapshot generated for a standard 
simulation can also be executed in the hardware-assisted platform. 
However, the fault injection feature provided by IFSS is only enabled 
within Incisive simulator flow. Since IFSS feature is not available in the 
PXP flow, then the simulation snapshot can not be recognized by the 
hardware-assisted platform. Therefore, two snapshots are generated from 
the elaboration executed for each sub-flow (Elaboration Acceleration and 
Simulation) as shown in Figure 40. In other words, the snapshot resulted 
from the “Elaboration Acceleration” step can be simulated too, but 
without the IFSS features enabled. However, the inverse is not true for 
the snapshot output of the “Simulation Elaboration”, which cannot be 
loaded in the hardware-assisted platform.  
In the IFSS flow, the faults to be injected must be defined at 
elaboration while the strobes are passed to the tool during the good run. 
The strobe definition includes the instance path of each node selected as 
an observation point, and the strobe type – i.e., function or checker. 
During the fault-free run (Good Run Acceleration in Figure 40), IFSS 
saves the traced data of the selected strobe signals. This trace information 
is constantly compared during fault injection runs (Fault Run Simulation), 
and a detection notification is issued if any discrepancy occurs. A similar 
116 
approach was implemented using the capability available in the hardware-
assisted platform to store waveform data of selected signals. After each 
accelerated fault injection (Fault Run Acceleration), the waveform data is 
compared with the one generated by the fault free-run (Good Run 
Acceleration) using a simulator utility that informs the timestamp and the 
signals of each existing mismatch. This post-run check procedure has a 
drawback compared to IFSS, which can stop the simulation as soon as the 
fault effect is detected at a checker strobe for example. Figure 41 
highlights the possible impact on the overall campaign execution time by 
the “stop at detection” and the “post-run check”. 
 
 
Figure 41 – The possible negative impact on the MADC performance due to the 
lack of support of “stop at detection” or because of the “post-run check”.   
It is important to notice that the possible negative impact on the 
performance of the MADC varies according to the fault campaign profile. 
The profile encompasses of the stimulus quality, the fault set, and the 
techniques used by the SMs being evaluated. Insufficient stimulus or 
specific SMs may require most of the simulation runs to be executed for 
longer periods thus reducing the performance difference between 
simulation and emulation achieved by the “stop at detection” feature. On 
the other hand, the acceleration provided by the hardware-assisted 
platform often compensates the simulation gain achieved with “stop at 
detection” even when many faults are shortly detected.  
The control of when and which faults are injected is performed by 
the implemented scripts with commands executed during the fault run for 
each engine. The script created to control the fault injection on PXP 
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executes the good run (Good Run Acceleration in Figure 40) to generate 
reference-data trace, which is stored in the host computer. Next, the 
snapshot is reset, and a fault is injected by using the force command. The 
trace data generated during the fault run (Fault Run Acceleration) is also 
copied to the host where the simulator utility is used to compare the 
waveform databases in order to classify the fault according to its detection 
status. The communication between the hardware-assisted platform and 
the host can become a bottleneck depending on network quality and the 
amount of strobe data generated. Many flow steps executed in the PXP 
fault injection script are not needed in the script created to control IFSS 
since the fault injection and the classification are featured by the 
simulator. The summary of the fault injection commands executed on 
each engine is shown in Figure 42. 
 
 
Figure 42 – The execution flow of the developed scripts for the simulation and 
the emulation platform.  
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An important optimization, applicable to simulation in general thus 
including IFSS, is the possibility to leverage a computer farm available to 
run multiple fault simulations in parallel. Similarly, PXP has many 
“domains” which are resources where snapshots can be loaded thus 
allowing parallel fault injection. The DRM for the distributed fault 
simulation and usage multi PXP domain could not be investigated due to 
the lack of resources available. These techniques can be explored later to 
optimize the MADC execution flow.  
 
6.4. CHAPTER REMARKS 
 
This chapter presented the methodology to accelerate DC 
assessment, which is the Thesis main contribution. The methodology 
consists on leveraging the PXP hardware-assisted verification platform to 
boost the performance of the fault injection campaign execution. To 
enable that, the GL-netlist is analyzed by the algorithm developed, which 
identifies the SAT faults that can be correctly emulated. This algorithm 
enables a non-intrusive approach to emulate most of the faults, and also 
observing the ISO 26262 guidelines. The remaining faults still have to be 
simulated using IFSS. The MUX example is used again to explain the 
proposed approach. In the next chapter, the results achieved using a more 
meaningful design is discussed. 
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7. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
 
7.1. CASE STUDY OVERVIEW 
 
To confirm the MADC results, faults selected for acceleration – by 
the proposed strategy – were also simulated and the equal fault detection 
status was obtained with both engines. As already mentioned, the safety 
related works available in the literature do not share details about the 
implementations used probably to avoid infringing NDAs since the safety 
analysis is closely related to the design. For instance, “MIPS-like” is the 
term used to refer to the design underlying the safety analysis presented 
in [41]. Another example can be found in [39] where the authors briefly 
discuss the results achieved “during the validation of a real safety critical 
system based on a 32-bit RISC processor” without further information on 
the design. On the other hand, there are safety related works which cover 
the topic at different abstraction levels thus not providing suitable test 
cases to be explored in this Thesis. For example, the authors of the DBW 
example used to introduce functional safety and the ISO 26262, perform 
the safety analysis over an existing prototype [31]. In this research, an 
open source design is used to show the MADC achieved results. The 
design is based on an OpenRISC architecture as illustrated in Figure 43 
[106] [107]. 
 
 
 
Figure 43 – OpenRISC block diagram (source [106]). 
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A leaf block of the OpenRISC design hierarchy was used as the 
fault target due to its small number of faults, thus fitting to the purpose of 
feasibility checking. The leaf block, in this case, is an unsigned carry 
adder (CA) automatically inserted by the synthesis tool. The adder 
composes the ALU (Arithmetic Logic Unit) of the OpenRISC CPU 
shown in Figure 44. 
 
 
 
Figure 44 – OpenRISC CPU. 
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“MADC analysis” showing that most of SAT faults can be accelerated. 
Naturally, only prime faults need to be run, i.e., 288 or 45% of all prime 
faults. The 288 faults were injected using both engines – PXP and IFSS – 
in order to validate the proposed MADC solution. This validation check 
consists in the comparison between the fault detection status and the 
detection time achieved with each tool. This checking stage exposed 
many challenges to be overcome by MADC.  
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Table 21 – MADC analysis results. 
Faults that 
can be: 
MADC Analysis 
Faults Ratio (%) Prime Ratio (%) 
Accelerated 928 72.5 288 45.0 
Simulated 352 27.5 352 55.0 
Total 1,280  640  
 
To allow the advanced classification available on IFSS, not just the 
detection status had to be reported, but also the strobes that were triggered 
in order to permit identification of the fault propagation through the 
functional, or the checker strobes. Additionally, the detection time had to 
be aligned with the time reported by the simulator. To achieve that, the 
instants when the strobes occur had to match on both engines. Initially, it 
was developed a script based approach to collect the strobe timestamps 
from simulation, and then use them during acceleration. However, the 
comparison overhead was prohibitive due to the amount of data handled 
in ASCII format hence impacting on performance. Although inefficient, 
the experience gained with the hardware-assisted platform was essential 
to further develop the MADC flow especially regarding storage and 
export of the trace data from the acceleration platform. 
Similar to other acceleration solutions, PXP permits to probe 
signals and stores the trace data in many formats. The format can be either 
customized using specific tool language or predefined standard waveform 
formats like value change dump (VCD). Naturally, PXP also supports the 
waveform database format used by the Incisive simulators. An Incisive 
utility named SimCompare permits to compare waveform databases. 
Signals to compare, time difference tolerance, maximum errors and many 
other comparison characteristics can be configured with SimCompare. 
Within the MADC flow, the waveform database generated during Good 
Run contains the same signals that are probed during the Fault Run, and 
they are all compared. In the fault injection context, only the earliest 
signals mismatch is interesting and no time difference tolerance is 
considered. Next, there is an example on how MADC configures 
SimCompare. 
 
1.   maxerrors 1 
2. database g <reference waveform database> 
3. database t <compared waveform database> 
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4. compare . 
5. report -detail errorsonly \ 
       -style comparescan \ 
       -values -output simcompare.rpt 
 
With this configuration, SimCompare stops the comparison at the 
first mismatch and report the details to simcompare.rpt. The details 
include the mismatching signals, their reference and compared values, 
and the timestamp of the earliest discrepancy found. Leveraging the 
SimCompare capability, it was possible to check if each detected fault in 
PXP had the same detection time as reported in IFSS. From the 288 
injected faults, only 46 were not detected as shown in Table 22. All other 
faults presented same detection time on both engines thus achieving the 
objective of validating the MADC for this initial test case. The detection 
information resulted from SimCompare is parsed and annotated back in 
the PG database as illustrated in Figure 40. The execution time required 
for the simulation and by the hardware-assisted platform is shown in 
Table 22 subdivided according to the fault detection status. 
 
Table 22 – MADC performance results. 
Status Faults Acceleration Simulation Ratio 
Detected 242 (84.03%) 6,372.67s 1,285.67s ▼ 4.96 
Undetected 46 (15.97%) 1,211.33s 3,954.33s ▲ 3.46 
Total 288 7,584.00s 5,240.00s ▼ 1.45 
 
The fault runs were executed sequentially on both platforms. The 
overall time results on Table 22 shows that the overall execution time 
achieved with the hardware-assisted platform was 1.45 times slower than 
simulation. This negative performance is mainly related to the time 
overhead for uploading the design to the acceleration platform and for 
dumping the waveform data at the end of each fault injection. 
Additionally, IFSS was configured to stop as soon as a fault is detected, 
but such capability for the acceleration platform is not yet implemented, 
and the post-run comparison based on SimCompare is the solution used 
within MADC flow.  
Considering only the undetected faults, which require the test to be 
fully executed, the acceleration gain has been 3.46 in comparison to 
simulation according to the results in Table 20. The acceleration factor 
per fault achieved by the hardware-assisted platform with the undetected 
123 
faults portion (i.e., only 15.97% of the faults) is higher than the factor 
reached by simulation considering the detected faults. In other words, if 
the ratio of undetected faults increases, then the overall execution time 
with the acceleration engine is likely to be better than with simulation. 
It is important to notice that the overall performance gain is 
associated with the detection profile of the fault set under consideration. 
Additionally, the strobes were placed on the boundary of the fault target 
instance. So, the location of the selected detection points means they are 
sequentially close to where the faults are injected. Since an SM, external 
to the ALU or even to the CPU, would result in strobes defined 
sequentially more distant, thus requiring a longer run until detection 
hence reducing the simulation performance associated with the group of 
detected faults – that stops the simulation at detection.  
 
7.3. USING MADC IN A SEQUENTIAL CIRCUIT 
 
The unsigned carry adder taken as fault target is purely 
combinatorial thus increasing the chances to rapidly detecting the injected 
faults. The technique used by the SM must also be taken into account. For 
instance, the evaluation of an SBST as an SM – that executes diagnostic 
routines during boot up or periodically for example – would naturally 
require longer simulations. Therefore, in such case, the usage of 
acceleration could be extremely beneficial for the performance of the SM 
evaluation. 
 
7.3.1. Tick Timer - Peripheral 
 
To validate such argument, a block with sequential elements at a 
higher level of the OpenRISC architecture was selected for the evaluation 
of the MADC fault target. The Tick Timer (TT) block illustrated in Figure 
43 was chosen as the fault target of the injection campaign for a sequential 
circuit. The Tick Timer unit provides a programmable counter at the clock 
frequency that can be used to interrupt the CPU once after a counter 
threshold is reached or periodically according to the configured time 
interval. Even if the software application running on OpenRISC does not 
use the Timer, a fault can still propagate out the Tick Timer block and 
cause an unexpected CPU interruption, for example. For this to happen, a 
fault may propagate through many registers until triggering an 
interruption or any other disturbance to the CPU. Therefore, the detection 
profile of the faults injected in the Tick Timer unit is expected to be 
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different from the one presented with the unsigned carry adder 
(combinational circuit).  
Again the structural analysis developed is utilized to select the 
faults that are going to be injected using the hardware-assisted platform. 
By providing the instance path of the Tick Timer unit, the SAT fault list 
is generated using the ATPG tool and the fault node information is 
collected via the synthesis tool. The node information corresponds to the 
details of each cell pin where the faults reported by the ATPG tool are 
located. These details are the number of ports connected to the pin (TIES), 
the pin direction (IO), and the cell name (CELL) back annotated to the 
PG database as illustrated in Figure 45. The prime fault ID (PRID), the 
equivalent grouped ID (EQID), the fault type (TYPE), and the testability 
(UTST) information are extracted from the reports generated by the 
ATPG tool. Notice that the faults which share the same EQID are 
members of the same equivalence group from where one fault, preferably 
located in a cell output, is marked as selected (SEL) for acceleration – see 
example highlighted in Figure 45. Although, faults residing in a cell input 
can be picked for acceleration when the collapsing group contains only 
two faults located in different cells – i.e., due to “1-1 LINE” collapsing 
rule. For instance, from the first two faults sharing the same EQID in 
Figure 45, the fault with PRID equals to five is selected instead to the 
other fault which its IO value indicates output.  
 
 
 
Figure 45 – MADC PG database content illustration.  
Actually, any of the faults with EQID equals to nine in Figure 45 
can be selected for acceleration. These faults are marked in Figure 46. 
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This flexibility can happen when the cell inputs where the faults are 
located have no more than two connections indicated by an empty value 
in the TIES column – i.e., faults with PRID equals to 9, 2052, and 2054. 
However, this is not always the case as highlighted in Figure 47, where 
some of the faults sharing the same EQID are located in cell input pins 
with ties greater than two. If instead of using the fault from the highlighted 
line, the fault with PRID equals to 3954 would have been injected using 
the force command, then 30 other cells would be affected from the 
moment the fault is inserted. At least one input of these 30 cells is tied to 
the same line that the injected cell input is tied as well. The remaining tie 
corresponds to line driver, which is naturally a cell output. 
 
 
 
Figure 46 – Fault equivalence group number nine illustrated in Figure 46.  
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Actually, any of the faults with EQID equals to nine in Figure 45 
can be selected for acceleration. This flexibility can happen when the cell 
inputs where the faults are located have no more than two connections 
indicated by an empty value in the TIES column – i.e., faults with PRID 
equals to 9, 2052, and 2054. However, this is not always the case as 
highlighted in Figure 47, where some of the faults sharing the same EQID 
are located in cell input pins with ties greater than two. Figure 48 shows 
how the faults with EQID equals to 135 are distribute in the TickTimer 
circuit. If instead of using the fault from the highlighted line, the fault 
with PRID equals to 3954 would have been injected using the force 
command, then 30 other cells would be affected from the moment the 
fault is inserted. At least one input of these 30 cells is tied to the same line 
that the injected cell input is tied as well. The remaining tie corresponds 
to line driver, which is naturally a cell output.  
 
 
 
Figure 47 – Importance of the right fault selection from an equivalent group. 
 
 
Figure 48 – Fault equivalence group number 135 illustrated in Figure 47. 
The example highlighted in Figure 47 exposes how important is to 
select the proper fault from each collapsed group in order to guarantee the 
valid fault injection results. Consequently, this emphasizes the value in 
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the contribution of the proposed MADC which automatically generates a 
list of the selected faults. 
The Tick Timer Unit has 4,014 SAT fault candidates according to 
the results from the ATPG tool. Additional 128 faults located in TIEUP 
logic are marked as untestable hence not considered for acceleration. The 
ratio of faults suitable for acceleration is shown in Table 23. The 
percentages of faults that can be accelerated before and after collapsing 
are similar to the numbers found for the unsigned carry adder shown in 
Table 21. 
 
Table 23 – Tick Timer fault candidates that are suitable for acceleration. 
Faults that 
can be: 
MADC Analysis 
Faults Ratio (%) Prime Ratio (%) 
Accelerated 3,031 ~75.51 909 ~48.04 
Simulated 983 ~24.49 983 ~51.95 
Total 4,014  1,892  
 
Table 24 compares the results from the CA and TT test cases 
regarding the average run time required for each fault injection.  
 
Table 24 – Runtime average per fault injection execution.  
Engine 
Run time per fault injection 
CA Time/#Faults TT Time/#Faults 
Acceleration 7,584s ~26.33s 22,025s ~24.23 
Simulation 5,240s ~18.19s 56,042s ~61.65 
#Faults / Ratio 288 ▼ 1.45 909 ▲ 2.54 
 
For the CA test case, the average execution time of each fault run 
was 1.45 times better than the acceleration. However, the experiments 
done with the TT instance, which has less than four times the number of 
faults in CA, already presented acceleration gain over simulation. As 
explained earlier, this alteration in the results was expected due to the 
fault injection profile. The TT block has registers thus making more 
difficult to propagate the fault. This affects the number of faults that are 
undetected, which for the TT test case corresponded to 74% of the 
injected faults. Another factor that impacts the average injection time is 
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the test duration. The test duration for the TT example is four times longer 
than the one used for the CA, in order to run at least up to the point where 
the software running in the OpenRISC can initialize TT block. Given that 
no SM is used, the outputs of the TT were selected as strobe points thus 
not contributing to a longer detection time. 
The acceleration achieved with the TT test case points to an 
opposite direction from the numbers obtained in the first experiment due 
to the profile differences between the two fault campaigns executed. 
Table 24 shows that average execution time for the fault injection on TT 
was 2.54 times faster when comparing with the injection of the same 
faults via simulation. This result corroborates to the idea that the 
campaign profile has a significant impact on the benefit potential of 
MADC. Fault campaigns on complex designs with not so many shortly 
detected faults, running complex TBs, with specific SMs – e.g., SBST – 
are likely to benefit from the proposed MADC approach. The benefit 
potential becomes more evident when separating the amount of time spent 
on each fault injection step executed in the hardware-assisted platform. 
Table 25 shows the average time required for loading the snapshot on 
PXP, injecting the fault while running the test, and comparing the 
waveform databases.   
 
Table 25 – Runtime average of each acceleration step for the TT test case. 
Engine 
Total  
Runtime 
Injection 
Time 
Strobes 
Check Time 
Snapshot 
Load Time 
Acceleration 
24.23s 
 
7.87s 
(32.47%) 
10.76s 
(44.42%) 
5.6s 
(23.11%) 
Simulation 
61.65s 
 
61.65 
(100%) 
– – 
Ratio ▲ 2.54 ▲ 7.83 – – 
 
If equivalent fault injection features supported on IFSS – i.e., stop 
at detection, and runtime comparison between good and fault run – would 
be available on the hardware-assisted platform, then the time spent with 
the strobes comparison could be saved. In the TT fault campaign, the 
waveform databases comparison consumed almost half of the fault 
injection run time as indicated in Table 25. Other approaches are being 
investigated in order to cope with this bottleneck.  
By only considering the actual time spent for a fault injection 
execution on PXP, and comparing with simulation, the difference would 
129 
be almost eight times (▲ 7.83) faster for the TT test case as shown in 
Table 25. However, even if the comparison time could be neglected, there 
is also the time consumed for loading the snapshot in the acceleration 
platform that must be considered. The loading time seems to be constant 
and mostly associated with the size of the snapshot and the quality of the 
network access to the area where the generated snapshot is located. 
Therefore, additional to the campaign profile, the snapshot size and the 
network quality needs to be counted when considering the trade-off 
between acceleration and simulation. In case DRM is available, the 
number of fault simulations in parallel that can be executed, must be 
examined. The same applies to the possibility of using multiple PXP 
domains for the fault injection – as it is used in [87]. 
 
7.3.2. Exception Handler – CPU Block 
 
The Exception Handler (EH) test case corresponds to one of the 
CPU blocks (Except) shown in Figure 44. The EH block has almost three 
times more gates than the TT unit. The difference in the number of faults 
between the EH and TT has similar ratio. The TT unit has 4,014 faults 
almost a third of the 11,798 faults found in the EH instance. Table 26 
summarizes the number of faults located in the analyzed CPU block.  
 
Table 26 – Exception handler fault candidates that are suitable for acceleration. 
Faults that 
can be: 
MADC Analysis 
Faults Ratio (%) Prime Ratio (%) 
Accelerated 10,030 85.01% 3,472 66.26% 
Simulated 1,768 14.99% 1,768 33.74% 
Total 11,798  5,240  
 
The fault set for the EH test case presented higher collapsed ratio 
if compared to the other two test cases. This fault set reduction due to 
collapsing has a positive impact on the MADC algorithm, which could 
then select more than 85% of all faults for acceleration. When considering 
only the prime faults, then 66.26% of the faults are suitable for 
acceleration. This percentage corresponds to a campaign where 3,742 
faults run on the hardware-assisted platform meanwhile the other 1,768 
are simulated. 
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Table 27 compares the runtime average for each fault injection 
between the TT and the EH test cases. Once again, the size of the of the 
block has influence on the campaign profiles thus highlighting even more 
the performance gain achieved with acceleration in comparison to 
simulation. It is important to notice that the runtime average per fault 
injection using the hardware-assisted platform ranges between 24.23 and 
26.33 considering the three test cases analyzed. With the runtime average 
not increasing, then acceleration shows great advantage over simulation, 
especially when there are many undetected faults among the MADC 
selection thus requiring to execute the whole test.    
 
Table 27 – Runtime average per fault injection execution. 
Engine 
Run time per fault injection 
TT Time/#Faults EH Time/#Faults 
Acceleration 22,025s ~24.23 88,408.4s ~25.46 
Simulation 56,042s ~61.65 357,133.0s ~102.86 
#Faults / Ratio 909 ▲ 2.54 3472 ▲ 4.04 
 
Table 28 shows the runtime average comparison between 
acceleration and simulation in total and the stepwise. The EH test case 
shows almost 60% performance ratio increase (▲ 4.04) than in the TT 
campaign. By analyzing the time spent on each step, and considering only 
the injection runtime, then the acceleration difference goes as high as 
12.54 times faster than simulation.   
 
Table 28 – Runtime average of each acceleration step for the EH test case. 
Engine 
Total  
Runtime 
Injection 
Time 
Strobes 
Check Time 
Snapshot 
Load Time 
Acceleration 
25.46s 
 
8.20s 
(32.21%) 
11.82s 
(46.43%) 
5.44s 
(21.36%) 
Simulation 
102.86s 
 
102.86 
(100%) 
– – 
Ratio ▲ 4.04 ▲ 12.54 – – 
 
Basically the same percentage (60%), related to the performance 
ratio increase, is achieved when comparing the gains resulted from the TT 
(▲ 4.04) and the EH (▲ 12.54) test cases, when considering the fault 
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injection runtime only. The same workload and test duration were utilized 
in both fault injection campaigns. The performance difference is believed 
to be associated to the number of observations points selected for each 
test case – all outputs of the corresponding module. The number of single 
bits selected as strobe points for the EH test case is 271, which 
corresponds to 8.21 times more bits than the 33 output signals found in 
the TT block. By not comparing the strobe data generated during the run, 
but instead at once as post-run process, then the amount of computation 
to check if the fault was detected, done with MADC, is not affected as 
much as for simulation.  
  
7.4. OPENRISC TEST CASE 
 
Together with the OpenRISC CPU, some peripherals, and a 
Wishbone Bus compose the SoC illustrated in Figure 49. A former 
version of the OpenRISC SoC already running on PXP was used to gain 
experience with the hardware-assisted platform. Many peripherals like 
PS2 and Ethernet Interface come along to that OpenRISC SoC version, 
and they were used together with a Linux distribution which can execute 
over the HDL of the design running on PXP and simulation as well. While 
the Linux boot up on PXP takes few minutes, over simulation the same 
procedure takes more than a couple of hours. Since such long test case 
was not suitable for the fault simulation at beginning, then a bare metal 
code application had to be used instead. However, only the source code 
and the image was available without the toolchain to compile a new one. 
Moreover, the toolchain available in the OpenRISC project website [106] 
could not be used since the executable code generated was not aligned to 
the outdated OpenRISC HDL version used. Therefore, all modules of the 
OpenRISC SoC were updated to the latest version available in the 
OpenRISC website repository. Hence the toolchain could be used to 
generate the memory image for each modification in the software code. 
This task was essential to get more familiar with the OpenRISC HDL 
description. 
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Figure 49 – OpenRISC SoC.  
The bare metal code executed by the OpenRISC generates image 
data that is copied to the memory address range used by the VGA 
Controller. A pseudo display window (VGA Display) is emulated in the 
host – it could be a physical display connected directly to PXP instead – 
where the VGA controller constantly updates with the image being 
generated. Meanwhile, a pseudo terminal (UART xterm) also running on 
the host shows the output printed by the program being executed in the 
OpenRISC. Notice that Ethernet, PS2, and I2C peripherals are not used 
in this application hence they were commented off from the OpenRISC 
HDL description. A routine interacting with the Tick Timer was added to 
the VGA bare metal code example used. At least two milliseconds of 
simulation is required to initialize and configure the VGA and TT 
modules, and start to execute few iterations of the image generation 
routine. The good simulation for the TT experiment took 331s to execute 
two milliseconds of the VGA test at GL. Given the long runtime, the VGA 
test seemed to be a suitable candidate to explore the MADC potential.  
SM based in software like SBST can be scheduled to execute when 
the vehicle starts, during the operation phase or before turning off [108]. 
Use fault injection to assess the DC of such mechanism is recommended 
by the ISO 26262 as already mention. However, an SM routine scheduled 
to execute at power-off of the vehicle requires the simulation of at least 
the complete start sequence, which may be prohibitive due to the given 
simulation time needed, especially at GL. Therefore, the proposed MADC 
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has significant contribution optimizing such scenarios. The complex 
workload prepared for the safety RISC example cited in [39] resulted in 
an average of 56.6s for each injected fault. Hence it is another candidate 
for acceleration leveraging the presented MADC.  
 
7.5. MADC PERFORMANCE COMPARISON 
 
As already mentioned, a similar approach based on design 
intrusion was proposed in a research developed at STMicroelectronics 
Inc. (ST) [87]. The proposed approach has an area overhead equivalent to 
eight gates per instrumented cell that is selected as fault target plus the 
fault injection controller developed. The controller occupies almost three 
times more resources on PXP than the tested IP itself – a Leon2 processor. 
Only SEU faults are considered, but the authors claim that SAT fault 
model is also supported by using the same instrumentation method. To 
cope with the massive area overhead to instrument both fault models on 
all cells, only few flip-flops are selected for the campaign, and they are 
grouped whenever possible in order to share the instrumentation logic. 
This optimization leads to area overhead minimization around 20% of the 
fault target.  
The results presented in the ST research are extracted from a fault 
injection campaign composed of 65,380,350 SEU faults injected in 2,631 
flip-flops at 24,850 different times. Given the small size of Leon2 IP, 19 
instances could be mapped per PXP domain. Using 16 domains, the 
developed approach could inject 304 fault in parallel. The full campaign     
execution last ten hours, which corresponds to more than 1.8k faults per 
second.  
Table 29 brings the ST’s Leon2 and the EH test case fault injection 
campaigns to a similar perspective in order to allow comparing the 
performance results. The ST’s technique achieves minimized runtime 
average per fault injection due to the substantial parallelism. Even 
considering the same number of runs in parallel, the proposed MADC 
would still result in a performance about 152 times lower than the 
intrusive method from the research developed at ST. Although, there are 
some difference in the campaigns that may explain such performance 
discrepancy. For example, the Leon2 design is approximately four and an 
half times smaller than the OpenRISC, which impacts in the snapshot 
loading time to PXP. The gate count number is no considering the 
OpenRISC memories since it is not clear whether they are accounted in 
ST’s example. Additionally, by injecting many faults in the same node, 
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considerably reduces the amount of instrumentation required by the 
proposed approach developed at ST. To inject faults in more candidate, 
the area overhead would limit the number of possible instances per 
domain, thus reducing the parallelism.   
 
Table 29 – MADC comparison.  
Characteristics 
Campaigns 
Ratio 
ST EH 
Design Leon2 OpenRISC – 
#equ. nand 2 56,565 259,149 ~4.58 
Fault target flip-flops All cells – 
#candidates 2,631 10,030  
#injections 65,380,350 3,471  
#Parallelism 304 1 304a – 
Time / Fault 0.0005506s 24.46s 0.08376s ~152.12 
a assuming the same number of instance ´ domains used for the EH campaign. 
 
The workload used in the research at ST’s executes the boot 
sequence, the program initialization plus 59,283 cycles, which 
corresponds to the fault injection time window. One million cycles are 
executed in the EH test case. Without knowing how many cycles are 
needed to boot up the Leon2 processor and initialize the program, it is not 
possible to perform a fair comparison. However, the test duration must 
also be considered when comparing the performance achieved in the two 
researches.  
The proposed non-intrusive approach presented in this Thesis has 
room for improvement, especially considering the implemented 
comparison technique which consumes up to 46.43% of the fault injection 
runtime. In addition, similar parallelization approach leveraged in [87] 
can boost MADC performance in many times. Another important aspect 
of the MADC approach is that around 50% of the faults can be simulated 
using a computer farm while the rest of the faults is accelerated in the 
hardware-assisted platform thus giving another parallelism factor. Such 
performance potential combined with the non-intrusive characteristic 
makes MADC more suitable for the semiconductor industry when 
targeting safety automotive applications.  
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7.6. CHAPTER REMARKS 
 
This chapter presents the experiments performed to guarantee the 
correctness of the results obtained with MADC regardless the achieved 
optimization. A second experiment was presented in order to demonstrate 
the potential benefit of employing MADC for the safety assessment of 
SMs in complex semiconductor design where long simulation runs are 
required, and hence acceleration can minimize the fault campaign 
execution time. The test cases used are discussed, and the importance of 
being an open-source design is highlighted. 
Different from any other solution found in the literature, MADC 
provides SAT fault injection acceleration without imposing the 
modification of the design model to enable the fault campaign. Therefore, 
the proposed solution fits the requirements specified in the ISO 26262 as 
already discussed. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
 
In this Thesis, we presented the MADC approach that enables the 
acceleration of DC assessment by leveraging the most advanced 
functional verification solutions including the latest fault simulator tools 
that already target functional safety. The verification environment (e.g., 
TB) can be seamlessly reused for the stimulus generation and therefore 
limitations from DfT oriented fault simulators (e.g., lack of TB support) 
do not apply to MADC. Benefiting from the cutting-edge emulators like 
those used in [86], MADC provides a non-intrusive solution, thus not 
requiring any design modification, and hence it is more likely to satisfy 
an ISO 26262 auditor. The intrusion characteristic is what makes MADC 
different from any other fault injection acceleration solution. Especially 
when comparing MADC to approaches based on FPGAs, where the 
design model is synthesized to a different technology, and sometimes also 
modified to enable acceleration. Moreover, the only solution using the 
same technology as MADC – i.e., hardware-assisted platform – to 
accelerate the fault injection campaigns, also relies on design 
instrumentation in order to enable the flow. 
MADC is part of a methodology being developed that extracts data 
from an FMEDA to assess the initially estimated DC numbers. This 
assessment must be done to provide enough confidence in the results. The 
results are annotated back to the FMEDA, and the hardware architecture 
metrics can be recalculated based on the actual design data. The 
conservative estimations and the refined metrics shall match. Moreover, 
to comply with the ISO 26262, it is fundamental considering the state-of-
the-art. Therefore, MADC is in evidence since it leverages the latest 
verification solutions to allow a more thorough safety assessment by 
reusing the functional verification environment and providing significant 
acceleration. 
An OpenRISC architecture has been used as test case for validating 
the developed MADC flow. Negative performance results were observed 
when injecting faults in a small combinatorial block of the OpenRISC 
ALU. However, considerable acceleration gain was observed when 
analyzing a larger block containing sequential cells. The existence of a 
threshold defining whether the MADC can be leveraged is discussed. This 
threshold seems to be influenced by the fault campaign profile. The 
profile includes the ratio of undetected faults, the test length, the 
sequential distance of the strobe points in relation to the fault injection 
locations, the SMs being evaluated, among other aspects. The obtained 
results using the MADC show great potential benefit when considering 
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its application to assess SMs based on software that naturally require long 
runs regardless the proportion of undetected faults.  
The results achieved could confirm the initial hypothesis that by 
selecting higher instances within the OpenRISC design, an actual 
acceleration gain can be obtained by employing MADC. Although, the 
implemented mechanism to enable fault detection on the verification 
platform imposes a significant bottleneck to the MADC performance, yet 
positive results could be observed. Therefore, the proof-of-concept built 
allowed to confirm the aimed contribution of this Thesis. Meanwhile, a 
solution for the bottleneck is being investigated to maximize the potential 
of the proposed MADC solution.   
A comparison between MADC and the most similar research work 
found in the literature was presented. The design model intrusion required 
by the compared approach makes the usage justification of such solution 
much more difficult, thus highlighting the MADC main contribution. 
Despite the intrusion aspect, the fault injection performance was 
compared. The massive parallelism implemented by the intrusive solution 
allowed achieving remarkable performance results. MADC could not get 
the same performance by considering if the same amount of parallelism 
would have been implemented in this Thesis. However, many arguments 
were discussed in order to provide a rational explanation for the 
performance difference. From this discussion, it was possible to identify 
some optimizations including the parallelism strategy, which can be 
leveraged by MADC.  
In this Thesis, the developed research targets the functional safety 
for car applications. Therefore, a thorough introduction to the ISO 26262 
standard, which drives the functional safety requirements in the 
automotive segment, is presented. However, MADC as a generic fault 
injection acceleration solution can be leveraged by other industry 
segments.  For example, in avionics, the functional safety standards make 
MADC a possible solution. Additionally, the scope defined in the first 
edition of the ISO 26262 will expand with the new release. Not just the 
car mass restriction is going to be dropped, but the scope will include 
motorcycles and different series production vehicles as well.  
As future work, the MADC can be extended to be used to support 
SEU faults or to accelerate fault injection at RTL. The deposit command 
– standard simulator feature and also available in the hardware-assisted 
platforms – can be used to mimic the SEU faults. The backward 
propagation is not a problem for SEU injection since the fault model 
applies to sequential elements outputs only. Fault injection at RTL can 
only be done at outputs of processes or assignments since the SAT fault 
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model has no clear meaning at the behavioral level. Therefore, MADC 
can be leveraged also to inject faults at RTL, thus allowing early 
verification of the DC and hardware architectural metrics. 
 
141 
REFERENCES 
 
[1] Infineon Technologies AG, “Sensor Solutions for Automotive, and 
Industrial Applications,” 2015. [Online]. Available: 
www.infineon.com/dgdl/Infineon-
Sensor_Solutions_for_Automotive_Industrial_and+Customer_Appl_B
R-2015.pdf?fileId=5546d4614937379a01495212845c039f. [Accessed: 
10-Jan-2016]. 
[2] L. Reger, “1.4 The road ahead for securely-connected cars,” in 2016 
IEEE International Solid-State Circuits Conference (ISSCC), 2016, 
pp. 29–33. 
[3] J. Gorzelany, “The Hottest 2016 New-Car Features,” 2016. [Online]. 
Available: www.forbes.com/forbes/welcome/#539c3c263e57. 
[Accessed: 11-Jul-2016]. 
[4] R. Nazaretian and G. M. Molen, “Reducing Vehicle Weight and 
Improving Security by Using Plastic Optical Fiber,” in 2015 IEEE 
Vehicle Power and Propulsion Conference (VPPC), 2015, pp. 1–6. 
[5] Freescale Semiconductor Inc., “Future Advances in Body 
Electronics,” 2013. [Online]. Available: 
www.nxp.com/files/automotive/doc/white_paper/BODYDELECTRW
P.pdf. [Accessed: 20-Jan-2016]. 
[6] International Organization for Standardization, “ISO26262 - Road 
Veichles - Functional Safety,” 2012. 
[7] Cadence Design Systems, “Incisive Functional Safety Simulator,” 
2015. 
[8] Synopsys, “Certitude.” [Online]. Available: 
www.synopsys.com/Tools/Verification/FunctionalVerification/Pages/c
ertitude-ds.aspx. [Accessed: 15-Dec-2016]. 
[9] I. Synopsys, “Z01X Functional Safety Assurance,” 2016. [Online]. 
Available: 
www.synopsys.com/Tools/Verification/FunctionalVerification/Pages/z
01x-functional-safety.aspx. [Accessed: 01-Jul-2016]. 
[10] Mentor Graphics, “Veloce2,” 2013. [Online]. Available: 
www.mentor.com/products/fv/emulation-systems/veloce. [Accessed: 
16-Jan-2016]. 
[11] Synopsys, “Zebu.” [Online]. Available: 
www.synopsys.com/Tools/Verification/hardware-
verification/emulation/Pages/default.aspx. [Accessed: 16-Jan-2016]. 
[12] Cadence Design Systems, “Palladium XP.” 
[13] M. Kooli and G. Di Natale, “A survey on simulation-based fault 
injection tools for complex systems,” in Proceedings - 2014 9th IEEE 
International Conference on Design and Technology of Integrated 
Systems in Nanoscale Era, DTIS 2014, 2014. 
142 
[14] Y. S. Jeong, S. M. Lee, and S. E. Lee, “A Survey of Fault-Injection 
Methodologies for Soft Error Rate Modeling in Systems-on-Chips,” 
Bull. Electr. Eng. Informatics, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 169–177, 2016. 
[15] International Organization for Standardization, “ISO26262 - Road 
Veichles - Functional Safety - Part 1: Vocabulary,” techreport, 2011. 
[16] International Organization for Standardization, “ISO26262/CD - Road 
Veichles - Functional Safety - Part 12: Adaptation for motorcycles,” 
techreport, 2016. 
[17] International Organization for Standardization, “ISO26262/CD - Road 
Veichles - Functional Safety - Part 11: Application of concepts for 
semiconductors,” techreport, 2016. 
[18] L. Rierson, “History of DO-178,” in Developing Safety-Critical 
Software: A Practical Guide for Aviation Software and DO-178C 
Compliance, 1st editio., CRC Press, 2013, pp. 51–55. 
[19] A. J. Kornecki and J. Zalewski, “Hardware certification for real-time 
safety-critical systems: State of the art,” Annu. Rev. Control, vol. 34, 
no. 1, pp. 163–174, 2010. 
[20] A. G. Foord, W. G. Gulland, and C. E. Howard, “Ten Years of IEC 
61508; Has It Made Any Difference?,” IChemE Symp., no. 156, pp. 
232–237, 2011. 
[21] MTL Instruments Group, “An introduction to Functional Safety and 
IEC 61508,” MTL Instruments Gr., no. HCSS++, 2002. 
[22] P. Koopman, “A Case Study of Toyota Unintended Acceleration and 
Software Safety,” Pittsburgh, PA, 2014. 
[23] B. Vlasic and M. Apuzzo, “Toyota Is Fined $1.2 Billion for 
Concealing Safety Defects,” The New York Times, New York, NY, pp. 
1–4, 14-Mar-2014. 
[24] D. J. Smith and K. G. L. Simpson, Safety Critical Systems Handbook: 
A Straightforward Guide to Functional Safety, IEC 61508 and Related 
Standards, 3rd Edtion. Oxford: Elsevier Ltd, 2010. 
[25] J. Schwarz and J. Buechl, “Preparing the future for functional safety of 
automotive E/E-systems,” in 21st (ESV) International Technical 
Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, 2009, pp. 1–3. 
[26] M. Schmidt, M. Rau, E. Helmig, and B. Bauer, “Functional Safety – 
Dealing with Independency, Legal Framework Conditions and 
Liability Issues,” 2011. 
[27] “ISO 26262 Academy Guide,” in International Conference ISO 
26262, 2016, pp. 1–22. 
[28] International Organization for Standardization, “ISO26262 - Road 
Veichles - Functional Safety - Part 10: Guidelines on ISO 26262,” 
techreport, 2012. 
[29] R. Mariani, “The impact of functional safety standards in the design 
and test of reliable and available integrated circuits,” in 2012 17TH 
143 
IEEE EUROPEAN TEST SYMPOSIUM (ETS), 2012, vol. 2011, pp. 1–
1. 
[30] International Organization for Standardization, “ISO26262 - Road 
Veichles - Functional Safety - Part 2: Managment of functional 
safety,” techreport, 2011. 
[31] A. Altby and D. Majdandzic, “Design and implementation of a fault-
tolerant drive-by-wire system,” Chalmers University of Technology, 
2014. 
[32] International Organization for Standardization, “ISO26262 - Road 
Veichles - Functional Safety - Part 5: Product development at the 
hardware level,” techreport, 2011. 
[33] DoD-US, “Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and 
Criticality Analysis,” Washington, 1998. 
[34] M. Chaari, W. Ecker, C. Novello, B. Tabacaru, and T. Kruse, “A 
model-based and simulation-assisted FMEDA approach for safety-
relevant E/E systems,” in Proceedings of the 52nd Annual Design 
Automation Conference on - DAC ’15, 2015, pp. 1–6. 
[35] L. Entrena, C. López-Ongil, M. García-Valderas, M. Portela-García, 
and M. Nicolaidis, “Hardware Fault Injection,” in Soft Errors in 
Modern Electronic Systems, M. Nicolaidis, Ed. Boston, MA: Springer 
US, 2011, pp. 141–166. 
[36] Yogitech Spa, “YOGITECH’s Smart Comparator for Lockstep 
Solution using ARM® Cortex®-R5,” 2015. 
[37] R. Mariani, T. Kuschel, and H. Shigehara, “A flexible microcontroller 
architecture for fail-safe and fail-operational systems,” 2nd HiPEAC 
Work. Des. Reliab., 2010. 
[38] R. Mariani, G. Boschi, and F. Colucci, “Using an innovative SoC-level 
FMEA methodology to design in compliance with IEC61508,” in 2007 
Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition, 2007, 
pp. 1–6. 
[39] A. Benso, A. Bosio, S. Di Carlo, and R. Mariani, “A Functional 
Verification based Fault Injection Environment,” in 22nd IEEE 
International Symposium on Defect and Fault-Tolerance in VLSI 
Systems (DFT 2007), 2007, pp. 114–122. 
[40] J.-L. Huang, J. C.-M. Li, and D. M. (Hank), “Logic and Fault 
Simulation,” in VLSI Test Principles and Architectures: Design for 
Testability, C.-W. Wu, L.-T. Wang, and X. Wen, Eds. Morgan 
Kaufmann, 2006, pp. 105–159. 
[41] Y.-C. Chang, L.-R. Huang, H.-C. Liu, C.-J. Yang, and C.-T. Chiu, 
“Assessing automotive functional safety microprocessor with ISO 
26262 hardware requirements,” in Technical Papers of 2014 
International Symposium on VLSI Design, Automation and Test, 2014, 
pp. 1–4. 
144 
[42] T. Instruments, “Safety Analysis Report,” Technical Documents, 2012. 
. 
[43] International Organization for Standardization, “ISO26262 - Road 
Veichles - Functional Safety - Part 9: Automotive Safety Integrity 
Level (ASIL)-oriented and safety-oriented analyses,” techreport, 2011. 
[44] S. Reiter, M. Pressler,  a. Viehl, O. Bringmann, and W. Rosenstiel, 
“Reliability assessment of safety-relevant automotive systems in a 
model-based design flow,” 2013 18th Asia South Pacific Des. Autom. 
Conf., pp. 417–422, Jan. 2013. 
[45] A. Avizienis, J. Laprie, B. Randell, and C. Landwehr, “Basic Concepts 
and Taxonomy of Dependable and Secure Computing,” IEEE Trans. 
Dependable Secur. Comput., vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 11–33, Jan. 2004. 
[46] B. E. Hallett, G. Corradi, and S. Mcneil, “Xilinx Reduces Risk and 
Increases Efficiency for IEC61508 and ISO26262 Certified Safety 
Applications,” 2015. 
[47] Y. Yu and B. W. Johnson, “Fault Injection Techniques: A Perspective 
on the State of Research,” in Fault Injection Techniques and Tools for 
Embedded Systems Reliability Evaluation, 1st ed., A. Benso and P. 
Paolo, Eds. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004, pp. 7–
18. 
[48] H. Ziade, R. Ayoubi, and R. Velazco, “A Survey on Fault Injection 
Techniques,” Int. Arab J. Inf. Technol., vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 171–186, 
2004. 
[49] S. Wagner, B. Schatz, S. Puchner, and P. Kock, “A Case Study on 
Safety Cases in the Automotive Domain: Modules, Patterns, and 
Models,” in 2010 IEEE 21st International Symposium on Software 
Reliability Engineering, 2010, pp. 269–278. 
[50] C. Ebert and A. Braatz, “Functional Safety with ISO 26262: principles 
and practice,” Webinars on Functional Safety / ISO 26262, 2014. 
[Online]. Available: 
http://vector.com/portal/medien/cmc/events/Webinars/2014/Vector_W
ebinar_FunctionalSafety_Principles_and_Practice_20141117_EN.pdf. 
[Accessed: 05-Oct-2015]. 
[51] T. Heijmen, “Soft Errors from Space to Ground: Historical Overview, 
Empirical Evidence, and Future Trends,” in Soft Errors in Modern 
Electronic Systems, M. Nicolaidis, Ed. Boston, MA: Springer US, 
2011, pp. 1–25. 
[52] P. E. Dodd, M. R. Shaneyfelt, J. a. Felix, and J. R. Schwank, 
“Production and propagation of single-event transients in high-speed 
digital logic ICs,” IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci., vol. 51, no. 6, pp. 3278–
3284, Dec. 2004. 
[53] D. Xueyan, W. Liyun, and L. Jinmei, “Effect of charge sharing on the 
single event transient response of CMOS logic gates,” vol. 32, no. 9, 
145 
pp. 3–8, 2011. 
[54] S. Sayil and J. Wang, “Coupling induced soft error mechanisms in 
nanoscale CMOS technologies,” Analog Integr. Circuits Signal 
Process., vol. 79, no. 1, pp. 115–126, Nov. 2013. 
[55] M. Saremi, A. Privat, H. J. Barnaby, and L. T. Clark, “Physically 
Based Predictive Model for Single Event Transients in CMOS Gates,” 
vol. 63, no. 6, pp. 2248–2254, 2016. 
[56] R. H.-M. Huang, D. K.-H. Hsu, and C. H.-P. Wen, “A Determinate 
Radiation Hardened Technique for Safety-Critical CMOS Designs,” J. 
Electron. Test., 2015. 
[57] J. Abella, F. J. Cazorla, E. Quinones, A. Grasset, S. Yehia, P. Bonnot, 
D. Gizopoulos, R. Mariani, and G. Bernat, “Towards improved 
survivability in safety-critical systems,” in 2011 IEEE 17th 
International On-Line Testing Symposium, 2011, pp. 240–245. 
[58] J. Abraham, R. Iyer, D. Gizopoulos, D. Alexandrescu, and Y. Zorian, 
“The future of fault tolerant computing,” in 2015 IEEE 21st 
International On-Line Testing Symposium (IOLTS), 2015, vol. 5, pp. 
108–109. 
[59] C. Hernandez and J. Abella, “Timely Error Detection for Effective 
Recovery in Light-Lockstep Automotive Systems,” IEEE Trans. 
Comput. Des. Integr. Circuits Syst., vol. 34, no. 11, pp. 1718–1729, 
Nov. 2015. 
[60] F. Hapke, W. Redemund, A. Glowatz, J. Rajski, M. Reese, M. 
Hustava, M. Keim, J. Schloeffel, and A. Fast, “Cell-Aware Test,” 
IEEE Trans. Comput. Des. Integr. Circuits Syst., vol. 33, no. 9, pp. 
1396–1409, 2014. 
[61] M. Stanisavljević, A. Schmid, and Y. Leblebici, “Reliability, Faults, 
and Fault Tolerance,” in Reliability of Nanoscale Circuits and 
Systems, New York, NY: Springer New York, 2011, pp. 7–18. 
[62] Z. Navabi, “Fault and Defect Modeling,” in Digital System Test and 
Testable Design, Boston, MA: Springer US, 2011, pp. 63–101. 
[63] Council Automotive Electronics, “AEC - Q100-007 Rev-B:FAULT 
SIMULATION AND FAULT GRADING,” 2007. 
[64] Y. Min and C. Stroud, “Introduction,” in VLSI Test Principles and 
Architectures: Design for Testability, C.-W. Wu, L.-T. Wang, and X. 
Wen, Eds. Morgan Kaufmann, 2006, pp. 1–36. 
[65] S. Rahkonen, “Mutation-Based Qualification of Module Verification 
Environments,” Tampere University of Technology, 2015. 
[66] A. Benso and P. Paolo, Fault Injection Techniques and Tools for 
Embedded Systems Reliability Evaluation, 1st ed., vol. 23. Boston, 
MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004. 
[67] R. Natella, D. Cotroneo, and H. S. Madeira, “Assessing Dependability 
with Software Fault Injection : A Survey,” ACM Comput. Surv., vol. 
146 
48, no. 3, p. 44:1-44:55, 2016. 
[68] Certress, “Certitude: Delivering Functional Qualification,” 2007. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.iss.se/files/4/Certess_datasheet.pdf. 
[Accessed: 07-May-2016]. 
[69] M. J. S. Smith, “Fault Simulation,” in Application-Specific Integrated 
Circuits, no. 1st, Addison-Wesley Professional, 1997. 
[70] Z. Navabi, “Fault Simulation Applications and Methods,” in Digital 
System Test and Testable Design, Boston, MA: Springer US, 2011, pp. 
103–142. 
[71] A. Efody, “Whose fault is it? Advanced techniques for optimizing ISO 
26262 fault analysis,” in Design & Verification Conference (DVCon), 
2016, pp. 1–9. 
[72] L. Entrena, M. Garcia-Valderas, R. Fernandez-Cardenal, A. Lindoso, 
M. Portela, and C. Lopez-Ongil, “Soft Error Sensitivity Evaluation of 
Microprocessors by Multilevel Emulation-Based Fault Injection,” 
IEEE Trans. Comput., vol. 61, no. 3, pp. 313–322, 2012. 
[73] J. Napoles, H. Guzman-Miranda, M. Aguirre, J. Tombs, J. Mogollon, 
R. Palomo, and A. Vega-Leal, “A Complete Emulation System for 
Single Event Effects Analysis,” in Programmable Logic, 2008 4th 
Southern Conference on, 2008, vol. 41092, pp. 213–216. 
[74] J. M. Mogollon, H. Guzmán-Miranda, J. Nápoles, J. Barrientos, and 
M. A. Aguirre, “FTUNSHADES2: A novel platform for early 
evaluation of robustness against SEE,” Proc. Eur. Conf. Radiat. its Eff. 
Components Syst. RADECS, pp. 169–174, 2011. 
[75] F. Ferlini, PLASER - Plataforma de Emulação de Soft Errors, 1st ed. 
Novas Edições Acadêmicas, 2015. 
[76] S. Misera, H. T. Vierhaus, and A. Sieber, “Fault Injection Techniques 
and their Accelerated Simulation in SystemC,” in 10th Euromicro 
Conference on Digital System Design Architectures, Methods and 
Tools (DSD 2007), 2007, no. Dsd, pp. 587–595. 
[77] J.-H. Oetjens, K. Grüttner, T. Kruse, C. Kuznik, H. M. Le, A. 
Mauderer, W. Müller, D. Müller-Gritschneder, F. Poppen, H. Post, S. 
Reiter, N. Bannow, W. Rosenstiel, S. Roth, U. Schlichtmann, A. von 
Schwerin, B.-A. Tabacaru, A. Viehl, M. Becker, O. Bringmann, A. 
Burger, M. Chaari, S. Chakraborty, R. Drechsler, and W. Ecker, 
“Safety Evaluation of Automotive Electronics Using Virtual 
Prototypes,” in Proceedings of the The 51st Annual Design 
Automation Conference on Design Automation Conference - DAC ’14, 
2014, pp. 1–6. 
[78] S. Reiter, A. Viehl, O. Bringmann, and W. Rosenstiel, “White-Box 
Error Effect Simulation for Assisted Safety Analysis,” in 2015 
Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design, 2015, pp. 534–538. 
[79] H. Mackey, “Sneak Peak: Inside NVIDIA’s Emulation Lab,” The 
147 
Official NVIDIA Blog, 2011. [Online]. Available: 
https://blogs.nvidia.com/blog/2011/05/16/sneak-peak-inside-nvidia-
emulation-lab. [Accessed: 13-Feb-2015]. 
[80] P. McLellan, “NVIDIA: Ten Months of Emulation on Palladium, 
Hours to Bring - Up,” Breakfast Bytes- - Cadence Blogs, 2016. . 
[81] F. Schirrmeister, “Productivity, Predictability, and Use-Model 
Versatility,” White Paper, 2013. [Online]. Available: 
www.cadence.com/content/dam/cadence-
www/global/en_US/documents/tools/system-design-
verification/palladium-xp-ii-wp.pdf. [Accessed: 30-Apr-2016]. 
[82] L. Rizzatti, “Hardware Emulation: Three Decades of Evolution - Part 
I,” Verification Horizons, Wilsonville, OR, pp. 26–27, 2015. 
[83] L. Rizzatti, “Hardware Emulation: Three Decades of Evolution - Part 
II,” Verification Horizons, Wilsonville, OR, pp. 40–42, Jun-2015. 
[84] L. Rizzatti, “Hardware Emulation: Three Decades of Evolution - Part 
III,” Verification Horizons, pp. 15–18, 2015. 
[85] David Kaushinsky, “Emulation Based Approach to ISO 26262 
Compliant Processors Design,” Verification Horizons, vol. 11, no. 2, 
Wilsonville, OR, pp. 47–53, Jun-2015. 
[86] O. Bailan, U. Rossi, A. Wantens, J.-M. Daveau, S. Nappi, and P. 
Roche, “Verification of soft error detection mechanism through fault 
injection on hardware emulation platform,” in 2010 International 
Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks Workshops (DSN-
W), 2010, pp. 113–118. 
[87] J. M. Daveau, A. Blampey, G. Gasiot, J. Bulone, and P. Roche, “An 
industrial fault injection platform for soft-error dependability analysis 
and hardening of complex system-on-a-chip,” IEEE Int. Reliab. Phys. 
Symp. Proc., no. January 2016, pp. 212–220, 2009. 
[88] L. Entrena, C. López-Ongil, M. García-Valderas, M. Portela-García, 
and M. Nicolaidis, “Hardware Fault Injection,” in Soft Errors in 
Modern Electronic Systems, Vol. 41., M. Nicolaidis, Ed. Boston, MA: 
Springer US, 2011, pp. 141–166. 
[89] P. Civera, L. Macchiarulo, M. Rebaudengo, M. S. Reorda, and A. 
Violante, “Exploiting FPGA for accelerating fault injection 
experiments,” in Proceedings Seventh International On-Line Testing 
Workshop, 2001, pp. 9–13. 
[90] P. Civera, L. Macchiarulo, M. Rebaudengo, M. Sonza Reorda, and M. 
Violante, “Exploiting FPGA-based Techniques for Fault Injection 
Campaigns on VLSI Circuits,” in Proceedings 2001 IEEE 
International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI 
Systems, 2001, pp. 250–258. 
[91] P. Civera, L. Macchiarulo, M. Rebaudengo, M. S. Reorda, and M. 
Violante, “An FPGA-based approach for speeding-up fault injection 
148 
campaigns on safety-critical circuits,” J. Electron. Test., vol. 18, no. 3, 
pp. 261–271, 2002. 
[92] C. Lopez-Ongil, M. Garcia-Valderas, M. Portela-Garcia, and L. 
Entrena, “Autonomous Fault Emulation: A New FPGA-Based 
Acceleration System for Hardness Evaluation,” IEEE Trans. Nucl. 
Sci., vol. 54, no. 1, pp. 252–261, Feb. 2007. 
[93] P. Kenterlis, N. Kranitis, A. Paschalis, D. Gizopoulos, and M. 
Psarakis, “A Low-Cost SEU Fault Emulation Platform for SRAM-
Based FPGAs,” 12th IEEE Int. On-Line Test. Symp., pp. 235–241, 
2006. 
[94] A. Lesea, S. Drimer, J. Fabula, C. Carmichael, and P. Alfke, “The 
Rosetta Experiment: Atmospheric Soft Error Rate Testing in Fiffering 
Technology FPGAs,” IEEE Trans. Device Mater. Reliab., vol. 5, no. 
3, pp. 317–328, Sep. 2005. 
[95] J. M. Kuuhn, T. Schweizer, D. Peterson, T. Kuhn, and W. Rosenstiel, 
“Testing reliability techniques for SoCs with fault tolerant CGRA by 
using live FPGA fault injection,” in 2013 International Conference on 
Field-Programmable Technology (FPT), 2013, pp. 462–465. 
[96] M. Aguirre, J. Tombs, F. Muñoz, V. Baena, A. Torralba, A. 
Fernández-León, F. Tortosa, and D. González-Gutiérrez, “An FPGA 
based hardware emulator for the insertion and analysis of Single Event 
Upsets in VLSI Designs,” in Radiation Effects on Components and 
Systems Workshop (RADECS), 2004, pp. 1–5. 
[97] M. a. Aguirre, V. Baena, J. Tombs, and M. Violante, “A New 
Approach to Estimate the Effect of Single Event Transients in 
Complex Circuits,” IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci., vol. 54, no. 4, pp. 1018–
1024, Aug. 2007. 
[98] A. Rohani and H. G. Kerkhoff, “A Technique for Accelerating 
Injection of Transient Faults in Complex SoCs,” in 2011 14th 
Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design, 2011, pp. 213–220. 
[99] M. Ebrahimi, N. Sayed, M. Rashvand, and M. B. Tahoori, “Fault 
injection acceleration by architectural importance sampling,” in 2015 
International Conference on Hardware/Software Codesign and System 
Synthesis (CODES+ISSS), 2015, pp. 212–219. 
[100] N. Bombieri, F. Fummi, and V. Guarnieri, “Accelerating RTL 
Fault Simulation through RTL-to-TLM Abstraction,” in 2011 
Sixteenth IEEE European Test Symposium, 2011, pp. 117–122. 
[101] Cadence Design Systems, “Encounter RTL Compiler,” 2013. 
[102] Cadence Design Systems, “Genus Synthesis Solution,” 2015. 
[103] International Organization for Standardization, “ISO26262 - Road 
Veichles - Functional Safety - Part 8: Supporting processes,” 
techreport, 2011. 
[104] Cadence Design Systems, “Encounter True-Time ATPG,” 2011. 
149 
[105] IEEE Computer Society, 1364-2005 - IEEE Standard for Verilog 
Hardware Description Language. New York, NY: IEEE Computer 
Society, 2006. 
[106] OpenCores.org, “OR1200 OpenRISC Processor,” 2012. [Online]. 
Available: http://opencores.org/or1k/OR1200_OpenRISC_Processor. 
[Accessed: 05-Feb-2015]. 
[107] J. Baxter, “Open Source Hardware Development and the 
OpenRISC Project,” KTH ROYAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, 
2011. 
[108] M. de Carvalho, P. Bernardi, E. Sanchez, M. S. Reorda, and O. 
Ballan, “Increasing the Fault Coverage of Processor Devices during 
the Operational Phase Functional Test,” J. Electron. Test., vol. 30, no. 
3, pp. 317–328, 2014. 
 
